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DOES ANALYST INDEPENDENCE SELL INVESTORS SHORT?
Jill E. Fisch

*

Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing
extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement
forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research.
Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were
necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of
sell-side research.
By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding
research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small
issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for research has become
increasingly segmented; institutional investors have access to highly sophisticated
and costly information sources, while retail investors are receiving less
information than ever.
This Article argues that these consequences were predictable. Because
research is a public good, and quality research cannot be produced at low cost, the
basic business model of the research industry requires firms to subsidize their
research operations—especially research that is widely distributed to retail investors—with other services. Analysts traditionally used investment banking revenues,
trading commissions, and proprietary trading to fund their research. These
services, in turn, created incentives for analyst optimism. Mandated independence does not change this market structure, and high-quality research cannot be
provided to public investors on a cost-effective basis absent a source of funding.
This Article proposes an alternative to mandated independence: a disclosurebased mechanism to manage analyst conflicts of interest. The Article argues that
the recent reforms should be replaced by a combination of analyst registration
and a new model of analyst disclosure through a Securities and Exchange
*
Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School (Fall 2007); Visiting Professor, University of
Pennsylvania Law School (Spring 2007); T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham Law
School, and Director, Fordham Corporate Law Center. An early version of this Article was
delivered as the keynote address at the 2005 Corporate Law Teachers’ Association Conference at
the University of Sydney Faculty of Law. I am grateful for the many valuable suggestions I
received at that conference and for the thoughtful commentary provided by Tony D’Aloisio,
managing director and chief executive officer, Australian Stock Exchange. I also received helpful
comments from Henry Hu, Donald Langevoort, Hillary Sale, Kurt Schact, Rob Sitkoff, and
Richard Squire. I presented prior drafts at the Symposium on Gatekeepers Today: The Professions
After the Reforms at Columbia Law School, the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on
Corporate Law at Fordham Law School, and Georgetown University Law Center, and received
many useful comments at each session.
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Commission Analyst Website (SECAW). SECAW would enable firms to
subsidize research while providing the information necessary to allow researchers
and investors to evaluate the quality of that research. At the same time,
SECAW would respond to concerns about segmentation, information access,
and non-investment-banking conflicts that have not been addressed by the
Global Research Settlement or other regulatory efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s revelations of widespread analyst misconduct,1 coupled with the dramatic collapse
of the technology bubble in the stock market, led to widespread calls for
increased regulation of research analysts. The U.S. Congress, the U.S.
1.
Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating
System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interests (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html. The results of the investigation were
detailed in Petitioner’s Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to Gen. Bus.
Law Section 354, at 10–13, Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8,
2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) answered the calls by adopting extensive regulatory
reforms.2 The reforms included required certifications of the views expressed
in analyst reports, a variety of disclosure requirements, and limitations on
personal trading by analysts. Most important, the reforms mandated the
formal separation of research from investment banking. The purpose of
the separation was to reduce conflicts of interest, thereby increasing
analyst independence.
The reforms are now in place, and the market has responded. Whether
greater independence increases the reliability of analyst research and reduces
biases is not clear. Preliminary studies suggest that analyst recommendations
are less optimistic than they were at the height of the technology boom of
the late 1990s. Analyst recommendations remain predominantly positive
and optimistic, however. Buy recommendations still dominate the market,
and sell recommendations are relatively rare. Moreover, the evidence on
the quality of sell-side research, both prior and subsequent to the regulatory
reforms, is far more equivocal, highlighting the distinction between
research quality and optimism.3
Even if researchers ultimately can demonstrate that the regulations
have improved the accuracy of analyst research, the structural changes
imposed by the regulations have been costly.4 Investment banks have
reduced their expenditures on analyst research. Many analysts, particularly the most experienced, fled to investment banking, the buy side, and
hedge funds. Analyst coverage, especially for smaller companies, has
declined dramatically. Currently, 35 percent of public companies listed on
the major stock exchanges have no research coverage at all.5 That number
increases to 83 percent for companies with market capitalizations of less
than $125 million.6 This decline in research coverage is a critical problem
for smaller companies, because a lack of research coverage increases capital
costs. The initial public offering (IPO) market also has been affected;
reduced information requires issuers to be larger and better established in
order successfully to access the public capital markets. In addition, lack of
coverage limits retail investor access to profitable investing opportunities.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part III (describing the regulatory reforms).
See infra Parts II, IV (describing empirical studies).
See infra Part IV (describing market responses to the regulatory changes).
FINAL REPORT OF THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES
TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 65 n.126 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport_d.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
6.
Id.
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The existing research market has become increasingly segmented.
Firms are offering new and enhanced services to large institutional clients
and focusing less on retail investors.7 Research firms are eschewing
public or even widespread distribution of their research, moving to a
business model in which information is limited to a small number of
clients—often hedge funds—who may pay $1 million a year or more for
exclusive and customized research services.8 Several organizations are
attempting to fill the void by creating a model of research for hire, in which
issuers pay for analyst coverage, but the viability of that model remains
unproven.9 Some critics claim that even the independent research mandate
of the Global Research Settlement is of little value to investors10—although
the program has clearly been a success for Morningstar, which is providing
the lion’s share of the research.11 On the whole, it is uncertain whether
increased analyst independence has benefited retail investors and the
capital markets.
The existing reforms also contain significant gaps. Although widely
billed as eliminating analyst conflicts of interest, the reforms focus almost
exclusively on investment banking conflicts. True independence would
require regulators to address brokerage conflicts, soft-dollar commissions,
proprietary trading (including trading by affiliated mutual funds), and the
differential treatment of institutional and retail customers. In addition,
because most of the recent reforms were imposed through a combination
of the terms of the Global Research Settlement12 and rules adopted by
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), they do not apply to all research
providers. In particular, analysts who do not work for broker-dealers remain
7.
See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text (describing research services targeted
to institutional clients).
8.
See, e.g., Monica Schulz, New Firms Push Exclusive Research (Luring Hedge Funds),
WALL ST. LETTER, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 2006
WLNR 17089489) (stating that the growth of customized research costs as much as $250,000 to
$350,000 per quarter and is aimed at hedge fund investors).
9.
See infra notes 229–250 (describing issuer-paid research).
10.
See Judith Burns, “Independent” Stock Research Hasn’t Been Must-See, WALL ST. J., Nov.
26, 2005, at B3.
11.
See, e.g., Matthew Keenan, Morningstar’s Net Soars as Research Takes Off, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., May 5, 2006, at 19 (explaining that six of ten Wall Street investment banks are buying
research from Morningstar as part of their obligations under the Global Research Settlement).
12.
See SEC, Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements (Apr. 28, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (describing settlement terms); Global Research
Analyst Settlement Final Judgment Addendum A (approved on Sept. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/finaljudgadda.pdf (describing settlement requirements
in more detail).
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largely unregulated. Extension of the reforms would, of course, generate a
substantially greater impact on the market.
This Article argues that the effects of the regulatory reforms were
predictable. Mandated independence is inconsistent with the business
model through which research is provided to retail investors and the
public. Because of the high cost of quality research, and because research
is a public good that offers firms limited ability to recoup its cost, analysts
have traditionally subsidized research through other business operations,
using trading commissions, investment banking revenues, and proprietary
trading to generate profits. Investment banking operations, for example,
emerged as a natural way to subsidize research on small public companies
that would otherwise be unprofitable. Investment banking also provided
information that analysts could incorporate into their research. The recent
regulatory reforms have eliminated the ability of firms to subsidize research
through investment banking. As a result, reducing the so-called analyst
conflicts has the effect of eliminating a critical source of research funding.
Even the temporary subsidy provided by the Global Research Settlement
has not compensated for this effect.
At the same time, increased independence is unlikely to eliminate
analyst optimism—the most visible result of investment banking influence.
Fundamental components of the market for research create incentives
for optimism, incentives that are fueled by the interests of analysts’ institutional clients and reinforced by issuers. As a result, the capacity of research
to mislead the retail investor remains substantial. Simply put, the independence mandate is problematic in terms of its effects on both the quality
and quantity of information received by investors, particularly retail investors.
In other work with Stephen Choi, I have proposed an alternative
source of funding for equity research.13 As we noted in that article, it is
possible to design structural reforms that allow research, and other services
that provide value to investors and the market to be funded independently
of business relationships that create potential conflicts.14 In the absence of
alternative sources of funding, however, mandated structural reforms to the
research industry are problematic. In addition, subsidies directed exclusively to equity research pose challenges in identifying the optimal level
of research. Without considering the relative advantages, in an ideal
world, of the two possible regulatory approaches—structural change versus
13.
Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003).
14.
Id. at 321–23.
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improved disclosure—this Article develops a disclosure-based alternative to
mandated independence.15 The premise of this approach is that investors
can be adequately protected through regulations that manage rather than
eliminate conflicts of interest. Toward that end, the Article introduces a
mechanism for increasing transparency through a combination of analyst
registration and a dedicated research analyst website.
Retail investors currently have very limited access to reliable information about the analysts whose recommendations they receive through
the Internet, the media, and other public sources. Although extensive
information on research analysts is available, it is not readily accessible to
small investors. The government has the ability to address this deficiency.
The Article proposes that the SEC obtain information about equity
analysts by imposing a registration requirement on all analysts who
disseminate their research broadly to the investing public. The registration
requirement would require analysts to disclose information about themselves
and their employers, including personal holdings and potentially conflicting
business relationships. In addition, analysts would be required to file publicly
disseminated research contemporaneously with the SEC. The SEC would
make this information available to the public by posting it on a newly
created SEC Analyst Website, known as SECAW. SECAW would establish
a single source through which investors, researchers, and the markets could
obtain information about analysts’ current and past recommendations and
coverage decisions and evaluate that information in light of specific factors
relating to analyst independence.
SECAW would dramatically expand the information available to the
investing public. It would enable retail investors to verify research, identify
potential conflicts of interest, and evaluate analyst performance. In addition,
SECAW would serve as a resource for private service providers and others
to compile information on analyst performance, to evaluate the effect of
analyst conflicts, and more. In particular, SECAW would enable researchers to determine the extent to which independence is a good proxy for
reliability. Importantly, SECAW would not be limited to addressing
conflicts of interest, but would offer a new and centralized source of data on
the overall quality of publicly distributed research.
15.
The approach developed in this Article is designed primarily to increase information
flow in the capital markets and to protect retail investors. As the Article demonstrates,
institutional and retail investors are not similarly situated with respect to analyst research.
Institutional customers have sufficient sophistication to detect and evaluate conflicts of interest
and to protect themselves by contract from conflicts that they view as harmful. As a result, there
is no justification for regulators to impose structural limits on these marketplace transactions.
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Although the filing requirement might seem burdensome, this Article
argues that, under appropriate conditions, public disclosure of analyst
research may serve the interests of an analyst’s institutional and issuer
clients. In addition, any burden is substantially less than that imposed
by a restriction on research funding such as the mandated separation of
investment banking from research. In sum, the proposal offers a return to
a market-based mechanism for funding research coupled with the
transparency that will allow the market itself to evaluate the reliability of
that research.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the role of the
research analyst and the business relationships that firms have used to subsidize the costs of research. Part II reviews the literature on analyst conflicts
of interest and considers the extent to which such conflicts have been
shown to bias analyst recommendations and affect research quality. Part III
briefly describes the recent regulatory reforms. Part IV focuses on the
effects of the regulatory reforms. Finally, in Part V, the Article describes its
proposed alternative—analyst registration and SECAW—and demonstrates
the superiority of this approach to the current regulatory regime.

I.

THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH ANALYST

A. Analysts and What They Do
Research analysts are financial professionals who research companies
and create reports and recommendations that are used by traders in making
investment decisions.16 SEC Regulation Analyst Certification (AC) defines
a research analyst as “any natural person who is primarily responsible for
the preparation of the content of a research report.”17 A research report is
defined as “a written communication (including an electronic communication) that includes an analysis of a security or an issuer and provides
information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision.”18
Analysts are commonly employed by banks, brokerages, investment advisors,
and mutual funds.

16.
See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation
of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040–43 (2003) (describing the role of the analyst).
17.
Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 (2005).
18.
Id.
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The literature has focused particular attention on the sell-side
analyst.19 The term “sell-side analyst” is used to describe securities analysts
employed by the research departments of full-service investment firms such
as broker-dealers and investment banks.20 The key point—and one that is
essential to this Article—is that research produced by sell-side analysts is generally available to the public, although institutional investors commonly use
sell-side research, and sell-side analysts may provide different or more timely
information to their institutional clients. In contrast, buy-side analysts,
who are typically employed by a mutual fund, hedge fund, or other institutional investor, produce research exclusively for the benefit of their employers.21
Analysts offer many types of information. They may cover smallcapitalization or newly public companies. They may specialize in an
industry or sector. They use a variety of financial models to assess company
fundamentals. They may use industry experts to evaluate new products or
trends. Ultimately, the analyst acts as an information intermediary,
acquiring and analyzing information and then transmitting that information to the marketplace.
The information provided by the analyst actually consists of three
discrete components. First and foremost, an analyst provides coverage.
Although this component of the analyst’s product is often overlooked,
simply by covering a stock, an analyst dramatically increases its visibility
to the investing public. For small- and mid-cap companies, analyst
coverage can make a significant difference in both liquidity and price. For
larger companies, the level of analyst coverage conveys important
information about the efficiency of the market for that company’s stock.22
19.
See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING SELLSIDE SECURITIES ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1 (2003), http://www.iosco.org/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD150.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO PRINCIPLES] (identifying conflicts faced by
sell-side analysts as posing “special problems with respect to investor protection”).
20.
IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REPORT ON ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 3
(2003), http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD152.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO REPORT].
21.
Id. at 3–4. Some analysts produce and sell information on a fee or subscription basis,
primarily to institutional clients. These analysts are sometimes described as independent
analysts, see id. at 4, although the nature and scope of this category varies depending on the
particular issue involved. For example, regulators have generally interpreted as independent, for
purposes of the Global Research Settlement, any analyst who is not employed by a firm that
engages in investment banking business. Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is
Fuzzier Than Ever—‘Independent’ Label Becomes a Mantra After the Crackdown, but Conflicts Have
Emerged, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1.
22.
See, e.g., Stuebler v. Xcelera.com (In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig.), 430 F.3d 503, 511
(1st Cir. 2005) (identifying the number of analysts covering an issuer as one factor to be
considered in determining whether the market for the issuer’s stock was efficient (citing Cammer
v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989))).
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Consequently, issuers regularly provide detailed information about analyst
coverage to their investors.23 In addition, coverage may operate as a signal
of issuer quality. Analysts convey negative information to the market by
terminating coverage of an issuer. Traditionally, analysts whose business
interests limited their willingness to issue sell recommendations used coverage decisions as an alternative mechanism for conveying negative information.24
Second, the analyst issues a report. An analyst combines both original
research and publicly available information and translates that information
into a format that is usable by investors and enables investors to compare
companies. The comparison process is facilitated by the use of objective
benchmarks such as earnings forecasts and price targets. Earnings forecasts
are one of the most salient pieces of information contained in the report and,
because they are objectively verifiable, are the focus of many empirical
analyses of analyst performance.
Comparison of companies is aided by the third category of information
provided by the analyst: the recommendation. Analysts generally rate each
covered security in terms of attractiveness, using a scale consisting of three
to five categories or ratings. Analyst recommendations have generated
considerable controversy, largely because they have been heavily skewed
toward the buy or strong buy categories, with very few investments rated as
sell. This bias has changed slightly in light of the analyst scandals of the
late 1990s25 and the regulatory response, which includes a requirement that
firms provide both an explanation and a distribution of their ratings.26 As a
result, analysts now issue more sell ratings. Researchers found, however,
that even before those changes, although the optimistic bias reduced the
information content of the ratings in absolute terms, analyst ratings and
ratings changes conveyed significant information.27
The market for analyst research is complicated by the public good
problem.28 An analyst can sell his or her research only if it contains information

23.
See, e.g., Delta, Analyst Coverage, http://www.delta.com/about_delta/investor_relations/
analyst_coverage/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (listing names, firm affiliations, and phone numbers
of individual analysts covering Delta); Onyx Pharmaceuticals, Analyst Coverage, http://www.onyxpharm.com/wt/page/analyst (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (listing names of analysts and their firms).
24.
See infra Part II (discussing analyst optimism).
25.
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
26.
See infra Part IV (citing statistics on analyst recommendations).
27.
See infra Part II.
28.
See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (2d ed. 1977) (defining
public goods as characterized by nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability of benefits); see
also Choi & Fisch, supra note 13, at 279, 286 (describing the consequences of the public good
problem for the provision of analyst research).
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that is not already in the public domain.29 It is difficult, however, to prevent
securities information from being leaked to investors other than those who
have produced or purchased the information. This causes the information’s
value to dissipate rapidly. Indeed, once an investor has traded, it is often in
his or her interest to leak the information to others.30 Because others cannot
readily be excluded from using the information, it is difficult for an analyst to
capture the full value of his or her research by selling it.31
Quality research is also costly.32 By definition, efficient markets rapidly
incorporate publicly available information into market price. Only by
uncovering material that is not widely known or by bringing an original
insight to existing data can analysts offer investors an informational
advantage, but uncovering such material is difficult. As a result, research is
widely recognized as a cost center at Wall Street firms rather than a source
of profits.33 One study reports that Wall Street firms spent $9.1 billion
producing research in 2003 but were only able to receive $5.91 billion for
selling that research.34 The costly nature of analyst research coupled with
the inability of analysts to finance their research through independent
market transactions has led to a variety of mechanisms for subsidizing the
cost of that research.35
29.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), “[i]t is the
nature of this type of information [that is contained in an analyst’s reports], and indeed of the
markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.” Id. at 659.
30.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984).
31.
Id. at 726.
32.
See Caren Chesler, Back to the Drawing Board; Independent Research Firms Are Still
Struggling to Find a Model That Will Put Money in the Bank, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Mar. 27,
2006, at 26, 29 (citing a 2004 Integrity Research Study showing that some big investment banks
spend as much as $600 million a year to run their research departments). But see Ann Davis,
Increasingly, Stock Research Serves the Pros, Not ‘Little Guy’—In the Wake of Spitzer Pact, Wall
Street and Upstarts Are Catering to Elite Few—Ordering ‘Bespoke’ Reports, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
2004, at A1 (reporting annual research budgets ranging from approximately $150 to $300
million). Some commentators have argued that by reducing selective information flow from
issuers to analysts, the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) has made the generation of
quality research substantially more costly, particularly for small issuers. See, e.g., Armando
Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information and the Cost of Capital (Working Paper,
July 8, 2004), available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Gomes.pdf (empirically studying
the effect of Regulation FD on information flow).
33.
See Chesler, supra note 32 (stating that “[i]t’s no secret that providing research on its
own is a money-losing proposition for the big banks”).
34.
Id.
35.
See Karen Richardson, Why Does Tech Teem With Analysts? Despite Settlement, IPO Fees
Still Lure, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2006, at C1 (quoting Scott Cleland, president of the research firm
Precursor, as stating that Wall Street research “isn’t necessarily driven by where the best
investment opportunities are . . . . It’s driven by what coverage areas they can get paid for”).
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Funding Research Through Other Business

Analyst research can be funded in several ways. It can be sold directly
to investors. It can be paid for, directly or indirectly, through brokerage commissions. It can be subsidized by investment banking revenues. Or, its costs
can be covered through proprietary trading by the analyst or his or her firm.
A number of research firms provide neither brokerage nor investment
banking services, and sell their research directly to investors. These
analysts are traditionally characterized as “independent” analysts.36 The
customers for this research are almost exclusively large institutional investors for whom the benefits of purchasing research justify the substantial
cost. Because the value of research dissipates quickly as it is disseminated,
it must be sold to a limited number of investors. One empirical study found,
for example, that profitable trading opportunities persisted for “roughly two
hours following the pre-market release of analyst recommendation changes
to clients.”37
Alternatively, research can be bundled with trading commissions.
Traditionally, analyst research was subsidized by brokerage commissions.38
Brokerage firms attracted trading customers through their ability to provide
high-quality research. Customers paid for that research by trading through
the broker. Because fixed commission rates prevented brokers from
competing on commission rates, research was one way for a firm to
distinguish itself from its competitors. Moreover, the inability of one
brokerage firm to undercut another by charging reduced trading fees
eliminated any incentive for a customer to obtain information from one
broker and then trade through a different broker.
The SEC’s elimination of fixed commission rates in 1975 substantially
reduced the ability of securities firms to finance research through brokerage
commissions.39 The low cost of Internet trading has caused commissions to
drop still further.40 Nonetheless, securities firms continue to use brokerage

36.
37.

But see infra Part IV (identifying conflicts of interest at so-called independent firms).
T. Clifton Green, The Value of Client Access to Analyst Recommendations, 41 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 23 (2006). In contrast, “profit opportunities dissipate within
seconds” following a release to the public through a medium such as a television broadcast.
Id. at 2 (citing J.A. Busse & T.C. Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. F IN. E CON.
415, 435 (2002)).
38.
See Choi & Fisch, supra note 13, at 286–87 (describing the history of subsidizing
research through fixed brokerage commissions).
39.
Id. at 287.
40.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at A1 (stating that the average commission has dropped
from fifteen cents per share in the early 1990s to five cents per share).
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commissions from institutional investors to subsidize their research. The
mechanism for doing so is known as “soft-dollar commissions.”41 Soft
dollars enable firms to bundle the cost of research with the cost of executing
trades. The resulting commissions charged by the securities firm are typically far greater than the cost of the trades.42 The difference between the
trading cost for the firm and the actual commission represents payment,
indirectly, for the research.
The soft-dollar structure is particularly attractive to fund managers
because, by incorporating the cost of research into commissions, the costs
of research are paid by the fund (and its beneficiaries) rather than by the
investment advisor.43 Soft dollars are explicitly authorized under § 28(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44 Nonetheless, they have come under
attack.45 One concern is that mutual funds have often used soft dollars
to purchase things such as computer equipment and office supplies, that
should be paid for by the investment advisor, not the fund.46 In addition,
some commentators argue that fund managers should choose brokers on the
basis of quality of execution rather than allowing execution to be bundled
with research.47 Finally, soft dollars enable fund managers to mask their
true cost structure because research paid for with hard dollars is included
41.
Soft dollars are the use of brokerage commissions to pay for research products and
services. Letter from Matthew P. Fink, President, Inv. Co. Inst., to William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, SEC, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Soft Dollars and Directed Brokerage
(Dec. 16. 2003) [hereinafter Request for Rulemaking], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/petn4-492.htm.
42.
According to the Wall Street Journal, soft dollars can have the effect of doubling the
commissions paid by mutual funds. See Charles Gasparino, Mutual-Fund Investors Risk Bite
From ‘Soft-Dollar’ Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1998, at C1 (quoting financial adviser Robert
Levitt as stating that money managers typically pay around six cents per share for softdollar commissions and three cents per share for commissions that do not include soft dollars).
43.
NASD REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, SOFT DOLLARS AND PORTFOLIO
TRANSACTION COSTS 3 (2004), http://www.nasd.com/stellent/groups/rules_regs/documents/
rules_regs/nasdw_012356.pdf.
44.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000). The statute was adopted, in connection with the elimination of fixed commissions, to protect mutual fund managers who paid more than the lowest
possible commission. NASD R EPORT OF THE M UTUAL F UND TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 2.
45.
See Request for Rulemaking, supra note 41 (calling for SEC rulemaking to address
abuses in the use of soft dollars).
46.
Id. Indeed, the SEC found examples of institutional investors using soft dollars to
pay for travel, entertainment, and limousine services. SEC, Inspection Report on the Soft Dollar
Practices of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers and Mutual Funds (1998), http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/softdolr.htm.
47.
MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM, BEST PRACTICES AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE
FOR MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS 17–22 (2004), http://www.mfdf.com/UserFiles/File/best_pra.pdf.
The Forum reasoned that its “guiding principles—that brokerage commissions are an asset of a
fund, that best execution is the most important factor and that transparency is important—weigh
strongly in favor of abandoning soft dollar arrangements involving fund assets.” Id. at 20–21.
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in a fund’s expense ratio, which is disclosed separately to investors, while
research funded with soft dollars is not, even though it has the same effect
of reducing the fund’s return to investors.48
Last year, in response to these concerns, Fidelity Investments announced
its decision to stop using soft dollars to pay for research.49 Although some
experts predicted that many other firms would follow,50 to date, other asset
managers continue to use soft dollars.51 Additionally, although regulators
recently considered banning soft-dollar commissions,52 they ultimately
retreated from the ban, perhaps in response to industry pressure.53 Instead,
in July 2006, the SEC issued interpretive guidance explicitly reaffirming the
legality of bundling research payments and brokerage commissions.54
It might seem that firms could also charge retail investors for research
by charging higher brokerage commissions. In the same way that brokers
use soft dollars to bundle research and trading costs, full-service brokerage
commissions bundle those costs for retail customers. In theory, retail
customers should be willing to pay these commissions to gain access to the
brokerage firm’s research. Since the elimination of fixed commissions,
however, retail commissions are highly ineffective as a method of
48.
NASD REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 43.
49.
Richard Beales, Fidelity Hardens Its Stance on Soft Dollars: Fund Manager Has Decided
to Pay Lehman Brothers Separately for Research, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 24, 2005, at 20.
50.
See, e.g., Jessica Papini, Fido/Lehman Move May Squeeze Analyst Comp, WALL ST.
LETTER, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 2005 WLNR
19182391) (quoting Morgan Stanley analyst Chris Meyer describing the move to unbundling as
“a strong trend because soft dollars are too dangerous”).
51.
See Chesler, supra note 32, at 30 (describing Fidelity Investments as the only firm to
have unbundled research payments from commissions and reporting results of a January 2006
Integrity Research survey of asset managers finding that 85 percent “say they still pay for research
with soft dollars”).
52.
See, e.g., Judith Burns, Business Isn’t Bustling as SEC May Move to Curb Soft-Dollar
Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C15 (describing possible SEC ban); Serena Ng,
‘Soft Dollars’ Flow to Independent Researchers—Hedge Funds Give Firms a Boost With Commissions
Frowned on by Regulators, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2005, at C3 (describing the SEC task force
created to examine the use of soft dollars). The U.S. Congress also held hearings on the use of
soft dollars and considered legislation that would have made their use illegal. See Mutual Fund
Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong., 2d sess. § 311 (2004) (proposing ban on soft dollars).
53.
See, e.g., Arden Dale, Wall Street Makes ‘Soft Dollar’ Pitch—Brokers, Money Managers
Urge SEC to Tread Lightly in Overhaul of Fee Deals, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2006, at C3 (describing
efforts by brokers and research firms to dissuade SEC from the ban). Industry insiders warned that
a soft-dollar ban would seriously impact independent research firms. See, e.g., Burns, supra note
52, at C15 (describing a 2004 survey of independent research firms by Investorside Research
Association reporting that “70% said they would consider quitting the business if the SEC bans
soft-dollar transactions”).
54.
SEC, GUIDANCE REGARDING CLIENT COMMISSION PRACTICES UNDER SECTION
28(E ) OF THE S ECURITIES E XCHANGE A CT OF 1934, at 3–4 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/interp/2006/34-54165.pdf.
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subsidizing research, because commission rates are subject to intense
competition, and retail customers have no obligation to trade exclusively
with a full-service broker. Investors can obtain research from Merrill
Lynch and then trade on that research through Charles Schwab or TD
Ameritrade, effectively avoiding paying Merrill Lynch for its research.55
Moreover, it is unclear that investors should be willing to pay brokers for
research. Empirical research suggests that the information value of research
dissipates rapidly; such research is unlikely to have investment value by
the time it finds its way into the hands of retail investors.56 Moreover,
because retail investors are under no obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the information that they receive, distribution to them is
tantamount to distribution to the general public, which has the effect of
reducing to zero the firm’s ability to charge for the information.
Nonetheless, a substantial percentage of retail investors continue to
trade through full-service brokers,57 which are increasingly offering investors
accounts in which fees are a percentage of assets rather than commissionbased, as well as a host of nontrading financial services including banking
and insurance.58 It is unclear whether the decision to use a full-service
broker is based on the availability of these bundled financial services;
whether investors benefit from more generic investment advice regarding
issues such as diversification, life-cycle planning, taxation, or identification
of alternative investment strategies including hedging; or whether using
a full-service broker is simply irrational.59
The limited ability of firms to subsidize research through transactions
with retail investors means that research is funded largely if not exclusively
by the firm’s institutional customers. As a result, institutional investors are
properly understood as the analysts’ true clients. This perspective is
55.
TD Ameritrade, for example, charges a commission of $9.99 for an online equity trade.
See TD Ameritrade, http://www.tdameritrade.com/welcome1.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
56.
See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit From the Prophets? Security Analyst
Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 562 (2001) (demonstrating that, although in
theory brokerage research has investment value, implementing analyst recommendations requires
high transaction costs and that, after accounting for those costs, research is unlikely to generate
positive abnormal returns).
57.
See Eleanor Laise & William Mauldin, Hook the Right Broker, S MART M ONEY,
Aug. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.edwardjones.com/cgi/getData.cgi?file=/pdf/SmartMoney_
Reprints_FINAL.pdf (stating that 28 percent of U.S. households use a full-service broker).
58.
See, e.g., id. (describing the services and accounts provided by full-service brokers).
59.
Many retail investors purchase mutual funds through full-service brokers, for example,
despite empirical evidence demonstrating that broker-recommended funds have higher fees
and inferior performance. Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in
the Mutual Fund Industry (HBS Finance Working Paper No. 616981, Mar. 15, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=616981.
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reflected in the differential treatment that institutional clients receive
from analysts, relative to retail investors or the general public.60 Analysts
systematically release information to their institutional investors prior
to its public release.61 This both prevents dissipation of the value of the
information and assures that by the time the information is released to
the public, its value has already been incorporated into stock prices. As Peter
Lynch has observed, investors are least likely to make money by following
recommendations on stock with large institutional ownership because
the smart money gets there first.62 In addition, retail investors often
receive incomplete information from analysts. For example, analysts may
release their recommendation but not the underlying report or financial
analysis supporting that recommendation, which contains the majority of
the valuable information.63
Investment banking provides an alternative source of funding for
analyst research. Analyst research complements a firm’s investment
banking business in several ways. Research departments cultivate relationships with institutional investors to whom the firm, acting as
underwriter, can sell new securities issues. Underwriters compete, in part,
based on their ability to get the deal done and their ability to maximize
selling price for the issuer; both types of services are enhanced by a
strong institutional client base. Analyst participation in the underwriting
process, in turn, provides comfort to institutional clients that the investment bank will support the offering through and beyond the underwriting
process. The liquidity risk associated with new issues, particularly from
small-cap companies, is greatly reduced by the assurance of continued
analyst coverage.

60.
See Green, supra note 37, at 1–3 (describing the fact that institutions pay for prior
access to analyst recommendations and that these recommendations have investment value,
but that the investment value has dissipated by the time the information is released to the
general public).
61.
See Gayle Essary, Financial Research: State of the Industry, Keynote Address at
Institutional Investors Forum 2004 (Feb. 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.investrend.com/
Admin/Topics/Articles/Resources/688_1128883186.doc) (criticizing this practice and arguing
that analyst upgrades and downgrades are material information that should be equally available
to all investors).
62.
PETER LYNCH, ONE UP ON WALL STREET (1989).
63.
Essary, supra note 61 (describing the “long-established industry practice of announcing
‘upgrades’ or ‘downgrades’ to the general public while making the full research report . . . available
only to a select group of clientele”).
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During the 1990s, investment banks increasingly drew analysts into
the underwriting process.64 Prior to the recent regulatory reforms, investment banks commonly used analysts to vet prospective offerings, review
and opine on investment banking deals, and help pitch the firm to
prospective investment banking clients.65 Analysts were sent on roadshows
to assist in marketing the securities to prospective clients,66 and were
also sent on nondeal roadshows to maintain interest in the securities of
existing or prospective clients.67 A handful of analysts achieved such prominence that they became media celebrities, receiving huge compensation
packages in return for generating investment banking business.68 Perhaps
best known was Salomon Smith Barney’s (SSB) Jack Grubman, who
became the guru of the telecommunications industry. SSB earned more
than $790 million in investment banking revenue from telecommunications
companies covered by Grubman.69 In return, Grubman received $67.5
million in compensation.70
Finally, firms can subsidize research by using it in their proprietary
trading and asset management activities. Similarly, analysts can, if their
64.
Investment banks may also use merger and acquisition (M&A) fees to subsidize
analyst research. As Adam Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari explain, “in every year since 1994,
M&A fees in the U.S. have been at least as large as equity underwriting fees and in recent years
significantly larger.” Adam Kolasinski & S.P. Kothari, Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity:
Evidence From Analysts Affiliated With M&A Advisors 7 (MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper
No. 4575-06, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=499068. Kolasinski and Kothari
describe the incentives for analyst bias based on M&A business, id. at 35, and report findings that
M&A affiliates and analysts bias their recommendations in ways that benefit their M&A
clients, id. at 29–30.
65.
SEC Complaint paras. 16–19, SEC v. Henry Blodget No. 03 CV 2947 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18115b.htm [hereinafter
Blodget Complaint] (describing how Merrill Lynch analysts assisted in investment banking deals);
Randall Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, Analysts’ Picks of Enron Stock Face Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb.
26, 2002, at C1 (explaining how analysts met “with chief executives and chief financial officers of
companies that are preparing initial public offerings of stock, vetting the companies so their firm
doesn’t agree to underwrite an IPO [initial public offering] they can’t recommend”).
66.
Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 65, at C1 (explaining that analysts “routinely” attended
pre-IPO roadshows “often helping company executives schedule ‘one-on-one’ meetings with
institutional investors that might buy the stock”).
67.
Blodget Complaint, supra note 65.
68.
See, e.g., Martin Sosnoff, Analyze This, FORBES, March 6, 2000, at 188 (describing how
Wall Street’s “celebrity analysts . . . lasso investment banking clients, then hawk the clients’
stocks 30 days after an initial public offering”).
69.
SEC Complaint para. 40, SEC v. Citigroup (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18111.htm.
70.
Id. para. 41; see also Complaint for Dep’t of Enforcement at 4, Dep’t of Enforcement v.
Quattrone, No. CAF030007 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
csfb/nasdquatt30603spincmp.pdf (stating that Quattrone earned compensation of more than $200
million from July 1998 to the end of 2001).
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employer permits, use their research to engage in profitable personal
trading. Trading covered securities can be profitable both because it
enables traders to use research information before it is broadly disseminated
and because the mere publication of a research report or recommendation
can have an effect on stock price, creating a trading opportunity.
An ownership interest by an analyst or his employer in covered
securities might not seem particularly problematic—after all, the analyst is
merely “putting his money where his mouth is.” Indeed, investors might
view an analyst recommendation as more credible if they know that the
analyst is investing in accordance with his public advice. Analysts and
their firms, however, may profit from the market effect of their public
recommendations rather than from the underlying research that supports
those recommendations.71 Indeed, analysts have engaged in personal trading
contrary to their public recommendations.72 Securities firms may trade
ahead of an analyst’s buy recommendation, effectively front-running the
firm’s own public statements.73 In some cases, the firm goes on to unload
the stock ahead of the investing public. In 2000, for example, the Wall
Street Journal reported that it was becoming increasingly common for
Wall Street banks to take multimillion dollar equity stakes in covered
companies.74 Although these stakes created a possible synergy between
the bank’s trading activities and its research arm, they also created the
risk that banks would distort their analyses to increase their trading
profits. In fact, the Journal reported that the banks often sold their stakes
at the same time that the banks’ analysts were maintaining buy or
strong buy ratings.75

71.
Trading on the market effect of an investment recommendation is known as frontrunning or scalping, which is prohibited by the Investment Advisers Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(2000); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (interpreting scalping
as a fraudulent practice under the Investment Advisors Act). Most analysts, however, are not
covered by the Act. Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1057.
72.
See Jessica Sommar, Red-Faced SEC Targets Two-Faced Analysts, N.Y. POST, May 24,
2002, at 41 (reporting that an SEC investigation found widespread personal trading by analysts
contrary to their public recommendations). In February 2006, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) fined Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. and analyst Brad Hintz a combined
$550,000 for personal trading by Hintz contrary to the firm’s published recommendation. Susanne
Craig, Moving the Market: Brokerage House, Analyst Are Fined in Conflict Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
2006, at C5.
73.
See, e.g., IOSCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 9 (reporting on how a firm “may take
advantage of pending research and position themselves ahead of its publication”).
74.
Mark Maremont, Raising the Stakes: As Wall Street Seeks Pre-IPO Investments, Conflicts
May Arise, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000, at A1.
75.
Id.
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II.

THE QUALITY OF ANALYST RESEARCH AND THE EFFECT
OF THE CONFLICTS

A. Analyst Incentives for Optimism
Do the business interests and relationships described in Part I affect
the quality of analyst research? In theory, research quality should be
controlled by market forces. Investors should be unwilling to pay for or
trade on the basis of poor-quality research. Reputational constraints,
particularly those imposed by institutional clients, should limit the ability
of analysts to bias their research out of self-interest. On the other hand,
informational asymmetries may limit the effectiveness of market checks.
Moreover, investors, particularly unsophisticated retail investors, may not
respond rationally to analyst reports and recommendations.76
The business relationships described above create obvious incentives
for analyst optimism. Brokerage firms earn commissions when their customers trade. By definition, buy recommendations have a larger target audience
of potential traders—the entire investing community. In contrast, the
market for sell recommendations is limited to current shareholders and
short sellers.77 As a result, an analyst who issues buy recommendations
will generate more commission revenue for his or her employer. The
incentives may also affect the analyst’s choice of which securities to cover.
Stocks with greater market capitalization, as well as growth and momentum
stocks, are likely to have greater trading volume.78
76.
See generally Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of
the Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57 (2006) (evaluating the extent to which
investor reliance on analyst research may be irrational); Michael B. Mikhail et al., When Security
Analysts Talk, Who Listens? (Working Paper, April 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=709801 (finding that sophisticated investors respond differently to analyst releases than
unsophisticated investors).
77.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1045 (explaining the effect of analyst incentives on
recommendations). Although the availability of short selling would appear to mitigate the
incentive for optimism generated by brokerage commissions, a variety of impediments to short
selling limit the ability of investor to profit from negative information. See, e.g., Eli Ofek &
Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113,
1118–20 (2003) (explaining the costs to institutional investors of shorting Internet stocks during
the dot-com bubble); Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 728–32 (1999) (describing regulatory
restrictions that limit short selling). In addition, analysts who have generated information used
by short sellers have been subject to some high-profile instances of issuer and regulatory pressure.
See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing Gradient Analytics).
78.
Empirical research supports this conclusion. See Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., Analyzing
the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?, 59 J. FIN. 1083, 1083 (2004) (finding that
analysts favor “glamour” stocks over value stocks).
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Because the goal of investment banking is to sell securities, investment
banking relationships create similar incentives for analyst optimism.
Institutional clients, after all, are unlikely to purchase securities unless
those securities receive a favorable recommendation. The underwriters’
sales are boosted by a positive analyst report, as are any efforts to stabilize
the price of the securities during the offering process. Analysts can both
contribute to the hype associated with a hot public offering and provide
credible support for the underwriters’ valuation. Notably, although it
is obviously important that analyst coverage not be negative, the mere fact
of coverage, particularly with the promise of continued coverage, heightens
the visibility of the securities and increases their liquidity. This link is
borne out by studies showing increased research coverage of industries,
like technology, with a high number of IPOs, even when that industry’s
performance over time is poor.79 Analyst incentives to support their employers’
underwriting business are, of course, increased when analyst compensation
is tied directly to underwriting success.80
Analysts’ relationships with their institutional customers can create
incentives for optimism even after the IPO process is complete. An institutional client is likely to feel betrayed if it purchases securities based on a
favorable analyst recommendation and the analyst subsequently lowers his
or her recommendation, leaving the client to bear the loss. Of course, an
analyst can privately advise institutional clients of a revision or a change in
recommendation prior to a public announcement; but lock-up restrictions,
liquidity constraints due to the size of an institution’s position, and the
response of traders to institutional sales are likely to prevent the client from
exiting fully before the stock price falls.81 Accordingly, investors themselves
create pressure for analysts to maintain positive recommendations even
when those recommendations may not be warranted. Institutions, company
officials, and sometimes the investment bank itself may also purchase
securities in the offering pursuant to lock-up agreements, in which they
agree not to resell the securities for a designated period of time—typically
six months. The promise of continued analyst support substantially reduces
79.
See Richardson, supra note 35, at C1 (citing report by Francois Trahan, chief investment strategist at Bear Stearns, showing that analyst coverage is “cluster[ed] around industries
that yield the greatest volume of IPOs and brokerage fees”).
80.
Interestingly, however, at least one study has found that analyst optimism does not
increase the firm’s likelihood of obtaining underwriting business. Alexander Ljungqvist et al.,
Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations,
61 J. FIN. 301 (2006).
81.
An analyst may also jeopardize the credibility of his or her future stock picks by
frequent downward revisions.
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the risk associated with this holding period. Indeed, it had been common
for analysts to issue new positive reports, or “booster shots,” shortly before
the expiration of these lock-up agreements, a practice that facilitated the
sale of the securities once the lock-up expired.82
Business concerns can affect analyst incentives in other ways. Prior
to the SEC’s adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), it was widely
believed that analysts traded favorable coverage of an issuer for superior
access to information. Analysts expressed concern that issuers would
respond to reports of negative information by failing to invite them to
analyst conferences, refusing to respond to telephone inquiries, and so
forth. Although Regulation FD attempted to respond to this concern
by prohibiting selective disclosure by corporate officials, the media continues to describe instances of issuer retaliation for unfavorable coverage.
One well-known example was the suit by LVMH Moët Hennessy
Louis Vuitton S.A. against Morgan Stanley in France.83 Morgan analyst
Claire Kent had published negative information about LVMH.84 LVMH
argued that Kent’s research was motivated by a desire to curry favor
with Morgan’s investment banking client Gucci Group, an archrival of
LVMH. A French court found that Kent had defamed LVMH and fined
Morgan €30 million.85 Incidentally, Institutional Investor had ranked Kent
as the number one analyst in her sector nine years in a row.86
Despite regulatory reforms, the media reports that punitive actions
continue against analysts who produce unfavorable research.87 For
example, Biotech analyst Matt Murray claims that he was fired in March
2006 by Rodman & Renshaw because of his efforts to downgrade the

82.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1050–51 (describing “booster shots”).
83.
See CFAI-NIRI Guidelines Not Nearly Tough Enough, Comments Independent Research
Provider, FINANCIALWIRE, May 24, 2004, http://financialwire.net/articles/article.asp?analystId=0&id=
8823&topicId=160&level=160 (describing the LVMH suit as one of “a spate of lawsuits and threats,
mostly in France . . . designed to squelch professional criticism”).
84.
John Carreyrou, Stock Analyst Ruled Too Critical, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at C1.
85.
Rodney Dalton, Analyst Thumped by French Handbag, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 26, 2004, at 28.
86.
Id.
87.
See, e.g., Matthew McClearn, Legal Weapon, CAN. BUS., Feb. 16, 2004, at 23 (quoting
Jonathan Boersma, vice president of professional standards of the Association for Investment
Management and Research, as stating that some firms are “either suing or threatening to sue
analysts for negative coverage”); Stockgate: Greenberg Suggests Hambrecht Analyst Forced Out Over
Overstock Downgrades, FINANCIALWIRE, Jan. 23, 2006, available at http://www.investrend.com/
articles/article.asp?analystId=0&id=22279&topicId=160&level=160 (reporting allegations that
analysts were fired for producing negative research about Overstock.com).
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stock of an investment banking client.88 Recently, two issuers, Biovail
and Overstock.com, sued research firm Gradient Analytics, claiming
that Gradient conspired with hedge funds to produce false negative
research so that the hedge funds could engage in profitable short selling.89
The issuer accusations also led the SEC to initiate investigations
against Gradient for market manipulation and illegal short selling.90
Even if Gradient successfully defends itself, the litigation will cause the
research firm to incur significant legal costs.
B.

Empirical Analyses of Research Quality

Do analysts respond to these incentives? Extensive empirical research
has been directed to the question of whether analyst research is tainted by
analysts’ business interests. As a threshold matter, the studies are hampered by limitations on available data.91 Independent research firms need
not and often do not disclose their recommendations publicly.92 Similarly,
limited disclosure of proprietary trading and other business relationships
impedes the ability of researchers to test the effect of conflicts of interest.93
In any event, the results of the empirical studies are unclear. Although
the studies find that analyst recommendations are optimistic, it is less clear
that this optimism misleads investors or detracts from the informativeness
88.
See, e.g., Robby Boyd, AG, SEC Looking Into Analyst’s Firing, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/10042006/business/ag__sec_looking_into_analysts_
firing_business_roddy_boyd.htm (describing ongoing investigations into allegations).
89.
See Brooke A. Masters, 2 Firms Claim Conspiracy in Analyst Reports; Short-Sellers and
Researchers Colluded, the Companies Say, WASH. P OST , Apr. 26, 2006, at D1 (describing
allegations in the lawsuits and pending SEC investigation).
90.
See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Subpoenas Research Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at
C3 (describing the SEC investigation).
91.
Many studies use the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database
maintained by Thomson Financial, which contains a substantial amount of data, but relies
on information voluntarily submitted by analysts. Researchers recently claimed that data
in I/B/E/S had been manipulated and that names of poorly performing analysts had been removed.
See Christopher Brown-Humes, 20,000 Analyst Names ‘Missing,’ F IN . T IMES, Nov. 8, 2006.
92.
See, e.g., Alistair Barr, Signs of Success Scarce for Global Research Settlement, I NVESTOR ’ S
B US . D AILY, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.investors.com/breakingnews.asp?
journalid=32406560&brk=1 (quoting Investars Chief Executive Kei Kianpoor as stating that
“[b]ecause all independent firms . . . aren’t forced to make [their stock ratings] public, any
analysis and ranking of their stock-picking performance is compromised”). As a result,
independent recommendations and forecasts often constitute a small percentage of the data
in empirical studies. See, e.g., Amanda Cowen et al., Which Types of Analyst Firms Are More
Optimistic?, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 119, 121 (2006) (explaining that less than 0.5 percent of the
forecasts studied were provided by independent analysts).
93.
The SEC Analyst Website (SECAW), the disclosure mechanism advocated by this
Article, would directly address these information limitations.
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of the analysts’ research. More importantly, the studies fail to make the
case that investment banking conflicts result in lower-quality research.
Studies clearly demonstrate that analyst research is optimistic in the
sense that buy recommendations greatly outnumber sell recommendations.94
The SEC reported survey results from 2000 showing that less than 1 percent
of all analyst recommendations were sell recommendations.95 A study by
Brad Barber and others found that analyst buy recommendations rose
to a peak of 74 percent of all recommendations in 2000, while sell
recommendations declined to 2 percent.96 Although studies have found
a decline in optimism following the stock market crash, the Global
Research Settlement, and increased analyst regulation, the numbers remain
skewed toward buy recommendations.97 Analyst optimism extends
beyond recommendations and also affects earnings forecasts and price
targets. Mark Bradshaw, Scott Richardson, and Richard Sloan, for
example, have demonstrated optimism in both earnings forecasts and target
prices.98 Anup Agrawal and Mark Chen found bias in analysts’ long-term
earnings forecasts (but not in short-term forecasts).99
Despite its optimism, analyst information clearly has information
value. The release of analyst information is surprisingly effective in moving
prices.100 A recent study by Paul Ryan and Richard Taffler, for example,
94.
See Fisch, supra note 76, at 64–65 (describing studies finding excessive analyst
optimism). Importantly, the studies do not incorporate noncoverage as a mechanism for conveying negative information.
95.
Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, Speech at the Third Annual SEC
Disclosure & Accounting Conference: The State of Financial Reporting Today: An Unfinished
Chapter III (June 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch508.htm)
(reporting that only 0.8 percent of 26,000 analyst recommendations surveyed as of March 1, 2000,
were sell or strong sell).
96.
Brad M. Barber et al., Buys, Holds, and Sells: The Distribution of Investment Banks’ Stock
Ratings and the Implications for the Profitability of Analysts’ Recommendations 3 (Working Paper,
Sept. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495882.
97.
See, e.g., id. (reporting that buy recommendations numbered 42 percent at the end of
June 2003, while sell recommendations had increased to 17 percent); see also Ohad Kadan et al.,
Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations—The Effects of the Global Settlement and Recent
Regulations 15–16 (AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, May 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=568884 (finding that analyst optimism decreased following the adoption of various
regulatory reforms).
98.
Mark T. Bradshaw et al., Pump and Dump: An Empirical Analysis of the Relation
Between Corporate Financing Activities and Sell-Side Analyst Research (Working Paper, May
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410521.
99.
Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Analyst Conflicts and Research Quality 25 (Robert
H. Smith Sch. Research Paper No. RHS 06-042, August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=559412.
100.
See, e.g., id. at 3 (citing studies demonstrating the investment value of analyst
forecasts and recommendations); Scott E. Stickel, The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell
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revealed that sell-side analyst recommendations and earnings forecast
revisions explain “17.4% of major market-adjusted price changes and 16.1%
of high trading volumes that are triggered by reported news events.”101
Analyst releases of reports or revisions commonly trigger significant stock
price reactions.102 Jeffrey Busse and T. Clifton Green demonstrated, for
example, that the market responds in seconds to analyst information aired
on CNBC and that the price response persists for weeks after the show.103
The price effect of analyst information is particularly significant in light
of the substantial institutional ownership of the market. Institutions, to a
large extent, move prices.104 Moreover, analyst coverage focuses primarily
on those issuers with substantial institutional ownership. Institutional
investors, unlike individual retail investors, should be aware of analyst’s
potential conflicts and not be fooled by tainted research or misled by
overoptimism. Institutional investors can and do use their own buy-side
analysts, who are free of the potential taint of the above-described business
relationships. Institutions also have the resources to purchase research
directly from analysts in market transactions that do not pose the risk of a
conflict. Yet, institutions use and rely on information from supposedly
conflicted analysts rather than relying exclusively on unaffiliated analysts.105
The only plausible reason for their continued use of sell-side research is
that, despite the potential conflicts, analysts provide useful information.106
Recommendations, F IN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 25, 25 (concluding that buy and
sell recommendations influence stock prices); Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’
Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 164 (1996) (finding “strong evidence
that stock prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes”).
101.
Paul Ryan & Richard J. Taffler, Are Economically Significant Stock Returns and Trading
Volumes Driven by Firm-Specific News Releases?, 31 J. B US. F IN. & ACCT . 49, 51 (2004).
102.
See, e.g., Peter Cohen, Apple Stock Jumps Following Analyst Report, MACWORLD, Nov.
22, 2004, available at http://www.macworld.com/news/2004/11/22/applestock/index.php (reporting
that Apple Computer stock reached a four-year high after the release of an analyst report).
103.
Jeffrey A. Busse & T. Clifton Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. F IN .
E CON. 415 (2002).
104.
See Scott Gibson & Assem Safieddine, Does Smart Money Move Markets?, 29 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 66 (2003) (finding that the magnitude of the price response to earnings
announcements is related to the extent and nature of institutional ownership).
105.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 37, at 1 (“Institutional investors pay significant amounts
to obtain real-time access to brokerage firm research through providers such as First Call . . . .”);
id. at 3 (“Trading activity more than doubles following recommendation changes . . . .”); Paul
J. Irvine, Analysts’ Forecasts and Brokerage-Firm Trading, 79 A CCT. REV. 125, 126, 147–48
(2004) (finding that clients of brokerage firms, including institutional investors, increase trading
in response to recommendations and forecast revisions of brokerage firm analysts).
106.
See Yingmei Cheng et al., Buy-Side Analysts, Sell-Side Analysts, and Investment Decisions
of Money Managers (Working Paper, Mar. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=383060
(modeling the manner in which fund managers use sell-side research and empirically testing
the factors that influence reliance on sell-side analysts).
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Regulators have attributed analyst optimism to investment banking
conflicts of interest. A substantial number of recent studies have
attempted to test this conclusion, and the results remain mixed. In
part, the conflicting results may be due to differences between analyst
recommendations and other information such as earnings forecasts. A
number of studies have found that analysts who are affiliated with
investment banking firms issue more optimistic recommendations than
nonaffiliated analysts,107 and that analysts make more optimistic recommendations with respect to issuers that have underwriting relationships
with their firms.108 A recent paper by Barber and others found a concentration of excessive optimism by affiliated analysts during the bear
market immediately following the NASDAQ market peak. The authors
posited that this optimism was due to a reluctance to downgrade stocks
whose prospects dimmed during the bear market.109 Similarly, Adam
Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari found “evidence that M&A related conflicts
significantly influence[d] analyst recommendations” during the 1993–2001
time period.110
Other studies have failed to find a strong tie between investment
banking relationships and forecast accuracy.111 Agrawal and Chen found
107.
See, e.g., Amitabh Dugar & Siva Nathan, The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships
on Financial Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 12 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 131 (1995) (finding the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations issued by analysts
affiliated with investment banks are more optimistic than those by unaffiliated analysts);
Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
and Investment Recommendations, 25 J. ACCT. & ECON. 101 (1998) (showing that affiliated
analysts issued significantly more favorable growth forecasts and recommendations); Anup
Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence From Stock Recommendations 33
(Working Paper No. RHS-06-038, July 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=654281
(finding that “analysts respond to investment banking and brokerage conflicts by inflating their
stock recommendations”).
108.
See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 657 (1999) (finding that lead
underwriter analysts make 50 percent more buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts).
109.
Brad M. Barber et al., Comparing the Stock Recommendation Performance of
Investment Banks and Independent Research Firms 3–4 (Working Paper, Sept. 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=572301. Significantly, however, the study found no significant bias
by affiliated analysts in the pre-2000 bull market. Id. at 3.
110.
Kolasinski & Kothari, supra note 64, at 2. But see Jonathan Clarke et al., Are Analyst
Recommendations Biased? Evidence From Corporate Bankruptcies, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 169 (2006) (finding that analyst recommendations for firms filing for bankruptcy
during the 1995–2001 time period were not overly optimistic and that affiliated analysts were
not influenced by conflicts of interest).
111.
At least one study has found that brokerage-affiliated analysts were even more
optimistic than analysts affiliated with investment banks. See Jeffery Abarbanell & Reuven
Lehavy, Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent
Bias and Over/Underreaction in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 7–8 (Working Paper, Jan. 2003),
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that neither brokerage nor investment banking conflicts affected the
quality of short-term earnings forecasts, after controlling for forecast age,
firm resources, and analyst workloads.112 They did find that long-term
forecasts produced by brokerage-affiliated analysts were optimistically
biased.113 Amitabh Dugar and Siva Nathan found earnings forecasts by
investment-banking analysts and non-investment-banking analysts to be
equally accurate.114 Amanda Cowen and others found that price and
earnings forecasts by underwriter analysts were less biased than those made
by analysts at brokerage-only firms.115 Jonathan Clarke and others found
“large investment banks issue less optimistic and more accurate earnings
forecasts, while making more favorable stock recommendations [than
independent analysts].”116 As this study demonstrates, although optimism is
related to forecast accuracy, it is not the same thing.117 John Jacob, Steve
Rock, and David Weber also found that “forecasts from analysts employed
by [investment banks] are generally more accurate than forecasts from
analysts employed by independent research firms.”118
On the whole, analyst-recommended stocks outperform the market,119
and this performance persists120 and is not a short-term reaction to the
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=232453 (finding that the distribution of negative forecast
errors by analysts is inconsistent with hypotheses of analyst optimism based on investmentbanking conflicts and other incentives).
112.
Agrawal & Chen, supra note 107, at 5.
113.
Id.
114.
Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 152.
115.
Cowen et al., supra note 92.
116.
Jonathan Clarke et al., The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Differences in Analyst Behavior
at Investment Banks, Brokerages and Independent Research Firms 4 (Working Paper, Sept. 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562181.
117.
But see Roger K. Loh & G. Mujtaba Mian, Do Accurate Earnings Forecasts Facilitate
Superior Investment Recommendations?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 455 (2006) (demonstrating a correlation
between forecast accuracy and the investment value of an analyst’s recommendations).
118.
John Jacob et al., Do Analysts at Independent Research Firms Make Better Earnings
Forecasts? 5 (Working Paper, July 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702.
119.
See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit From the Prophets? Security Analyst
Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 561 (2001) (finding that purchasing stocks with
the most favorable consensus recommendations produces higher returns absent transaction costs).
120.
Some studies have found underperformance for discrete time periods. For example,
Roni Michaely and Kent Womack’s widely cited study finds that affiliated analyst
recommendations led to lower returns than those of unaffiliated analysts for the 1990–1991
time period. Michaely & Womack, supra note 108; see Maureen F. McNichols et al., The
Performance of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations 19 (Working Paper, Aug. 2004), available at
http://home.business.utah.edu/actmp/wconf05/micnicholsobrienpanalsysts.doc (suggesting that
Michaely and Womack’s findings may be specific to the time period of their sample).
Similarly, Brad Barber and others found that analyst-recommended stocks underperformed
less-favored stocks during the 2000–2001 time period. Brad Barber et al., Reassessing the
Returns to Analysts’ Stock Recommendations, F IN. A NALYSTS’ J., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 18.
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recommendation itself.121 Maureen McNichols and others studied buy
recommendations following an IPO and found that buy recommendations
from affiliated analysts “generally earned significantly higher returns”
than those from unaffiliated analysts.122 Significantly, the study was
conducted during the 1994–2001 time period, a period in which affiliated
analysts were alleged to have engaged in the most egregious misconduct.123
Leslie Boni and Kent Womack found that analysts are particularly effective
at picking and ranking stocks within their industry of expertise, suggesting
that industry-specific knowledge is a component of the value provided by
analyst research.124
There are several reasons why analysts affiliated with investment
banks might produce more accurate information. One possible explanation
is the presence of natural synergies between investment banking and
research.125 For example, investment-banking analysts may have access
to superior information or a better understanding of the industry by virtue
of their firm’s investment banking operations.126 A currently pending
securities fraud case against Credit Suisse, for example, is premised on
the claim that Credit Suisse analysts, by virtue of their involvement in
the firm’s investment banking operations, obtained negative information about America Online (AOL) that they failed to disclose in

121.
122.
123.
124.

See Womack, supra note 100.
McNichols et al., supra note 120, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Leslie Boni & Kent L. Womack, Analysts, Industries, and Price Momentum, 41 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 85, 106 (2006); see also Chul W. Park & Morton Pincus, Market
Reactions to Changes in Analyst Consensus Recommendations Following Quarterly Earnings
Announcements 1 (Working Paper, Oct. 2000), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/accounting/
papers/workingpapers/00-10.pdf (finding that analyst consensus revisions have information
content and concluding that this “finding is consistent with the capital market viewing consensus analyst recommendation revisions as reflecting valuable expertise to process and interpret
public signals”).
125.
Cf. Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and
Underwriting, 60 J. FIN. 2763 (2005) (identifying synergies when a financial institution provides
both loans and underwriting services to an issuer and concluding that such synergies benefit the
issuer through lower underwriter fees and loan costs).
126.
See Murali Jagannathan & Srinivasan Krishnamurthy, Investment Banker Directors and
Affiliated Analysts’ Forecasts, 3 J. INV. MGMT. 4, 19 (2005) (finding that firms with investment
banker directors issue more accurate forecasts and attributing that accuracy to better access to
firm-specific information); Erik Sirri, Investment Banks, Scope, and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest,
(Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/fm2004/sirri.pdf
(describing potential synergies and economies of scale that can result from integrating
investment banking, securities sales, and proprietary trading within a single financial firm);
see also Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 152.
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their research reports.127 But for the firm’s investment banking operations,
the analysts would not have had access to this information.
Alternatively, differences in pay structures and resources may enable
investment banks to attract better analysts.128 The high compensation paid
to analysts because of their role in investment banking during the late
1990s, the time period that is the subject of many of these studies, may
have allowed investment banks to attract highly skilled analysts.129 A third
possibility is that, although the conflicts have the potential to distort
analyst reports, analysts do not respond to this incentive. Perhaps the
incentive is outweighed by the analyst’s need to maintain a sufficient
reputation for accuracy to be able to convey information credibly to the
market. Mark Chen and Robert Marquez, for example, model the relationship between investment banking conflicts and research quality. As they
have demonstrated, the desire to attract future underwriting business
may create an incentive for optimism, but unbiased research may lead to
more accurate pricing or a better stock of underwriting customers.130
The benefits to the firm of accurate research may act as a check on an
analyst’s natural tendency toward optimism because too much optimism
will result in the analyst losing his or her credibility and thus the ability
to help sell securities.131
Studies have found that analyst reputation matters, suggesting that
the market disciplines analysts for tainted research. Lily Fang and
Ayako Yasuda found that recommendations by analysts with strong
reputations have the greatest market effect.132 Similarly, Sorin Sorescu
and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam observed that “there is reliable evidence
that both experience and reputation count in the analyst industry.”133
127.
In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Mass. 2006).
128.
See Jacob et al., supra note 118, at 5 (suggesting that their findings are consistent with
higher skill levels and resources at investment banks).
129.
See Nina Mehta, Sellside Research Must Try Harder: Rocked by Scandals, Institutional
Sellside Research Will Never Be the Same, TRADERS MAG., Dec. 1, 2003, at 32, 38 (describing analyst
compensation as dropping by 30 percent during 2003, as firms began to implement regulatory reforms).
130.
Mark A. Chen & Robert Marquez, Regulating Securities Analysts (Working Paper, Mar.
2004) (copy on file with the UCLA Law Review).
131.
This perhaps explains Alexander Ljungqvist and other’s finding that analyst optimism
does not enable investment banks to attract underwriting business. See Ljungqvist et al., supra
note 80 (finding no evidence that aggressive analyst recommendations or upgrades increased their
employer’s ability to win an underwriting contract).
132.
Lily H. Fang & Ayako Yasuda, Are Stars’ Opinions Worth More? The Relation Between
Analyst Reputation and Recommendation Values (AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Dec. 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687491.
133.
Sorin Sorescu & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, The Cross-Section of Analyst Recommendations,
41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 139, 141 (2006).
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Additionally, the market appears to respond to investment banking and
other conflicts by discounting information that carries the greatest risk of
bias. For example, studies have shown a limited market response to buy
recommendations issued by investment bank–affiliated analysts, a more
significant response to recommendation revisions, and a greater response
to downgrades than to upgrades.134
The empirical results are troubling, because they highlight a key
concern about mandated analyst independence. If analyst research
provides useful information to the market and if affiliated analysts produce
more accurate research, either because of synergistic effects or higher
pay scales, then the forced separation of investment banking from research
may reduce not just research quantity, but also research quality. Moreover,
if the top sell-side analysts cannot receive multimillion dollar compensation
packages based on their firm’s investment banking revenues, they are likely
to seek alternative positions in which they can receive comparable
compensation positions that may reduce public and market access to the
information they produce.135

III.

REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ANALYST CONFLICTS

U.S. regulators responded to the analyst scandals136 with a variety of
new rules.137 The new regulations include disclosure requirements,
134.
See Carl R. Chen et al., Are All Security Analysts Equal?, 25 J. FIN. RES. 415, 426 (2002)
(finding that national brokerage firm analysts have the greatest ability to affect stock prices,
but that buy recommendations from such analysts do not have a significant effect on firm
valuation); Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 150 (showing that market participants seem to
discount optimism in investment banker analysts’ research more heavily, but the difference is
not statistically significant); Michael J. Ho & Robert S. Harris, Market Reactions to Messages From
Brokerage Rating Systems, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 49 (finding that stock prices react
more significantly to ratings downgrades than to upgrades).
135.
Hedge funds, for example, are reportedly bringing some former sell-side analysts
in-house. Identifying short-selling opportunities for hedge funds can be lucrative; top analysts are
reportedly commanding compensation packages of $1 to $4 million. Ann Davis, Negative Analysts
Score Points, W ALL ST . J., Nov. 23, 2004, at C5.
136.
For a further description of the analyst scandals, see Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and
the Analyst Scandals, 58 A LA. L. R EV . 1083, 1083–84 (2007).
137.
Evaluating the rationale for and effect of the U.S. regulatory reforms is important
from a global perspective because a number of countries are examining potential analyst
conflicts of interest and considering the extent to which they should follow the U.S. regulatory
approach. See, e.g., AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: AN
ASIC GUIDE FOR RESEARCH REPORT PROVIDERS 4 (2004), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/
lkuppdf/ASIC+PDFW?opendocument&key=managing_conflicts_interest_guide_pdf; AUSTL. SEC.
& INV. COMM’N, RESEARCH ANALYST INDEPENDENCE 8 (2003), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/
pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Analyst_Independence_Report.pdf/$file/Analyst_Independence_
Report.pdf; FOREIGN GROUP TO THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS: BEST
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limitations on personal trading by analysts, and a variety of structural
reforms. The reforms characterize analyst business relationships as conflicts
of interest138 and attempt to reduce or eliminate these conflicts through
mandated independence. The primary focus is on investment banking
conflicts of interest.139 The regulations require that firms formally separate
research from investment banking and attempt to eliminate the potential
influence of a firm’s investment banking operations on analyst behavior.
Significantly, the reforms do not address the relationship between research
and brokerage, nor do they require that analyst compensation be independent of a firm’s trading commissions.
Of the reforms, the Global Research Settlement between the New
York attorney general, the SEC, and ten large Wall Street banks received
the most public attention and imposes the most extensive restrictions.140
The terms of the settlement mandated a formal separation of investment
banking and research for firms subject to the settlement.141 The settlement
PRACTICES IN AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET (2003), http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal_market/securities/docs/analysts/bestpractices/report_en.pdf; IOSCO TECHNICAL
COMM., REPORT ON ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 2 (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD152.pdf; IOSCO T ECHNICAL COMM., S TATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
FOR A DDRESSING S ELL -S IDE SECURITIES A NALYST C ONFLICTS OF I NTEREST (2003),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD150.pdf; Fin. Serv. Auth., Conflicts of Interest:
Investment Research and Issues of Securities (Consultation Paper 171, Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp171.pdf.
138.
It is not clear that this characterization is warranted. Cf. Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial
Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 152 (2001) (defining a
conflict of interest as “a condition in which an individual’s professional judgment is unduly
influenced by some personal gain”).
139.
See SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts
of Interest (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm
(describing limitations on investing banking contacts as “designed to maintain the analyst’s role
as gatekeeper in the offering process but to prevent the analyst from serving as marketer or
cheerleader for investment banking transactions”).
140.
See SEC, supra note 12 (describing settlement terms); Global Research Analyst
Settlement Final Judgment Addendum A, supra note 12 (describing settlement requirements in
more detail).
141.
Importantly, the reforms described in this Part apply only to the investment banks that
participated in the settlement. Initially, the settlement applied to ten banks, but two additional
banks subsequently agreed to be bound by the settlement. See Press Release, SEC, Deutsche Bank
Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2004-120.htm. Some states are imposing the provisions of the settlement more broadly.
Former California treasurer Phil Angelides, for example, imposed the requirements, including the
physical separation of investment banking and research, on all investment banks that do business
with the State of California. Press Release, Phil Angelides, Cal. Treasurer, Treasurer Angelides
Announces Tough New Requirements for Investment Banks That Do Business With State of
California (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2003/20030508ips.pdf;
Press Release, Off. of the N.J. Att’y Gen., New Jersey to Receive $561,458 in Wachovia Settlement
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requires firms both to maintain Chinese Walls (information barriers) and
a physical separation between investment banking and research.142 All
communications between analysts and investment bankers are strictly
limited—communications are prohibited except on specifically designated
topics, and those communications must be made in the presence of a
chaperone.143 Analysts are prohibited from assisting the underwriting
process in various ways, and an analyst’s compensation may not be
based on underwriting performance. Firms are also required to provide
investors with a variety of disclosures—including a “warning notice”
that the firm’s investment banking business may affect the objectivity
of its research, and quarterly disclosure of the firm’s earnings forecasts,
ratings, and price targets—in order to enable investors to evaluate analyst performance.144 The settlement also required the banks to provide
independent research to their customers for a period of five years under
the supervision of an independent consultant.145 According to SEC
Chairman William Donaldson, the settlement was designed “to help
restore investor’s faith in the objectivity of research.”146
In section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,147 Congress directed
the SEC or the SROs to promulgate rules to address analyst conflicts of
interest more broadly. The statute explicitly stated that its objective
was “to protect the objectivity and independence of securities analysts.”148
Congress’s instructions with respect to the required rulemaking were fairly
detailed: Congress specified that the rules were to restrict prepublication
(Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases06/pr20060907a.html (describing
efforts by North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Analyst Research Task
Force Steering Committee in organizing and coordinating efforts of state regulators to address
research analyst conflicts of interest).
142.
See SEC, supra note 12. The physical separation requirement has resulted in firms
constructing separate offices and even bathrooms. As one banker only “half-jokingly” stated, “he
was not even allowed to go into the bathroom with a research analyst without a compliance officer tagging along, although that is not quite how he phrased it.” Landon Thomas, Jr. & Gretchen
Morgenson, 2 Analysts Likely to Pay $20 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2003, at C1.
143.
Indeed, the SEC only subsequently conceded that a chaperone was not required
to supervise a phone call in which an analyst and an investment banker merely scheduled a
future chaperoned conversation. Letter from James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Dir. of SEC Div. of
Mkt. Regulation, to Dana G. Fleischman, SEC Answer to Question 12 (Nov. 2, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/grs110204.htm.
144.
William Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Address Prepared for Delivery at SEC
Press Conference Regarding Global Settlement (Apr. 28, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803whd.htm).
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
148.
Id. § 501(a)(1).
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clearance of research reports by investment bankers, to prevent investment
banking personnel from supervising analysts or evaluating them for purposes
of compensation decisions, and to prohibit retaliation for research that
adversely affected a firm’s investment banking relationships.149 The statute
also required rules that establish “structural and institutional safeguards”
to separate research from investment banking within firms.150 In addition,
Congress instructed the regulators to require a variety of disclosures,
including information about an analyst’s personal ownership positions in
covered securities and investment banking relationships.151 Again, the focus
on the statute was investment banking conflicts, not brokerage or other
business relationships. Importantly, because the statute was structured as a
component of the SEC’s regulatory authority over registered brokers and
dealers, it does not extend to analysts that are not associated with a registered
broker or dealer. In particular, the statute does not give the SEC the
authority to regulate pure research firms or their analysts.
The SEC delegated responsibility for compliance with section 501
to two SROs: the NYSE and the NASD.152 The NYSE and the NASD
adopted two sets of rule changes to address analyst conflicts, one while
Congress was in the process of considering the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the second subsequent to the adoption of the statute.153 Briefly, the
149.
Id.
150.
Id. § 501(a)(3).
151.
Id. § 501(b).
152.
See Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 43 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm (describing the
SEC’s approval of the self-regulatory organizations (SRO) rules and explaining that “[t]he
Commission worked closely with the SROs to conform their rules to meet the directives of the Act”).
153.
See Self-Regulating Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed
Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 to the
Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (May 10, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm [hereinafter First SRO Analyst Release]; SelfRegulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock
Exchange to Rules 344 (“Supervisory Analysts”), 345A (“Continuing Education for Registered
Persons), 351 (“Reporting Requirements”) and 472 (“Communications with the Public”) and by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest
and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to
the Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875
(July 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm [hereinafter Second SRO
Analyst Release].

70

55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 39 (2007)

reforms, which are concentrated in NASD Rule 2711154 and NYSE Rules
472155 and 351,156 incorporate three approaches: structural safeguards,
prohibitions on problematic practices, and increased disclosure requirements. With respect to structural safeguards, the reforms parallel the
guidance reflected in the statute. They include a prohibition on investment
banking personnel supervising analysts or approving their reports, a ban
on retaliation for research reports that adversely affect the firm’s investment banking business, and the establishment of quiet periods during which
investment banks participating in an offering are prohibiting from releasing
research reports.157 The rules also detail formal procedures to insulate
analyst compensation from investment banking influence, including the
requirement that banks use compensation committees to determine analyst
compensation, which must be based on performance and research quality,
not on investment banking business.158 Prohibited practices include the
issuance of booster shots and the participation by analysts in solicitations of
investment banking business, as well as the receipt by analysts of pre-IPO
securities and personal trading during blackout periods surrounding the
release of a research report.159
The rules also increase disclosure requirements. Analysts are required
to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest, including whether
the subject company is a client of the analyst’s firm and any firm compensation based on investment banking revenues. In addition, the rules require
information about the firm’s rating systems, including an explanation of
“the meanings of all ratings used by the member or member organization
in its ratings system,”160 “the percentage of all securities that the member or
member organization recommends an investor ‘buy,’ ‘hold,’ or ‘sell,’”161
and “a chart that depicts the price of the subject company’s stock over
time and indicates points at which a member or member organization
assigned or changed a rating or price target.”162

154.
NASD Rule 2711, NASD Manual (CCH) 4516-25 (Dec. 2006).
155.
NYSE Rule 472, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2472 (Oct. 2006).
156.
NYSE Rule 351, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2351 (Mar. 11, 2004).
157.
See First SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153 (summarizing rule changes); Second
SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153 (same).
158.
See sources cited supra note 157.
159.
See sources cited supra note 157.
160.
NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(f), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2472 (Oct. 2006).
161.
Id. at 472(k)(1)(i)(g).
162.
Id. at 472(k)(1)(i)(h); see also Brad Barber et al., supra note 96 (describing the distribution disclosure required by NASD Rule 2711 and empirically analyzing its effect).
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The SRO rules expand the limitations on personal trading by analysts.
NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2210 had previously required that analysts disclose if they had a financial interest in a covered security, although
there are indications that enforcement of the requirement was extremely
limited.163 The new rules expand on the disclosure requirement and
explicitly require that analysts disclose personal positions in covered
company securities, including options and derivatives positions, both in
their reports and in public appearances.164 In addition, the rules prohibit
analysts from personal trading in covered securities “for the period beginning 30 days prior to the issuance of the research report and ending five
days after the date of the report. The analyst also may not engage in
trading contrary to the analyst’s most recent recommendations.”165
The SEC enacted two rules addressed to analyst conflicts of interest.
SEC Regulation FD,166 which was adopted in 2000 prior to the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, attempts to reduce the analyst’s incentive to
provide favorable coverage of an issuer in order to gain access to information by barring issuers from providing selective disclosure.167 The SEC
characterized the rule as an effort to reduce analyst conflicts, explaining:
“Selective disclosure also may create conflicts of interests for securities
analysts, who may have an incentive to avoid making negative statements
about an issuer for fear of losing their access to selectively disclosed
information.”168 Regulation AC,169 which was adopted in 2003, was intended
by the SEC to complement the new regulations adopted by the SROs.170
Regulation AC requires analysts to certify that the views expressed in their
163.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1043–44 (describing the prior disclosure requirements).
164.
First SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153. It is unclear exactly what this disclosure
requirement means. As the SEC noted in its release, previously the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) had allowed the use of conditional language, such as the firm or its analysts
“may own” covered securities. Id. The Release does not explicitly reject the use of such
language, and it appears that some firms are continuing to structure their disclosures in this
way. In addition, firms are only required to disclose ownership positions of 1 percent of the
issuer’s equity securities. Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
167.
Id. For a detailed discussion of Regulation FD and the history of its adoption, see
Fisch & Sale, supra note 16.
168.
SEC, Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules (Aug. 10,
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm.
169.
Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33,8193, 68 Fed. Reg.
9482 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm.
170.
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposal of
Regulation AC (July 24, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch578.htm).
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reports reflect their personal views and to disclose any relationship between
their compensation and their recommendation.171

IV.

EFFECTS OF THE REGULATORY REFORMS

A. Effect on Analyst Recommendations and Performance
Although it is far too soon to measure the effect of the new regulations,
early reports are mixed. The evidence indicates that analyst recommendations, although still optimistic, have become more balanced. For
example, research by Ohad Kadan and others found that affiliated
analysts recommendations are now no more optimistic than those of
unaffiliated analysts.172 Troublingly, however, they found that recommendations are now less informative.173 Barber and others found a substantial
decline in the percentage of buy recommendations issued by investment bank–affiliated analysts after 2000 and an overall increase in
analyst use of negative or neutral recommendations.174 In part, however,
the change appears to reflect a shift in rating systems—in particular, the
move by a number of firms from a five-category to a three-category
rating scale.175 In addition, the percentage of negative or sell
recommendations has remained low176 and is again shrinking. StarMine
Investors reported that only 7.1 percent of analyst recommendations were
sells in 2006, down from a peak of 10.4 percent in 2003.177
With respect to performance, the large-scale studies still primarily
consider data from the period prior to the implementation of the
171.
Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33,8193, 68 Fed. Reg.
9482 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm.
172.
Kadan et al., supra note 97, at 26.
173.
Id. at 15.
174.
Barber et al., supra note 109, at 14. On the other hand, Leslie Boni found that the
ten investment bank signatories to the Global Research Settlement both reduced coverage
and increased the optimism of their recommendations. See Janet S. Kidd, With Analyst
‘Sell’ Signals Rare, Investors Need to Be Alert, A SSOCIATED P RESS, Sept. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/yourmoney/sns-yourmoney-0910analysts,0,1718220.story?
coll=bal-business-headlines (reporting Boni’s findings).
175.
Kadan et al., supra note 97, at 1. As the authors explained, “eight out of the original
ten participants in the Global Settlement adopted a new rating system in 2002, and ten of
the next twenty biggest brokerage houses adopted a new rating system starting in 2002.” Id.
at 9. In every case, the new system reflected a change from a five-point scale to a threepoint scale. Id. Interestingly, the authors found that the market failed to respond to these
massive reclassifications. Id. at 10–11.
176.
Id. at 32 (reporting that, even postregulation, analysts are reluctant to issue
pessimistic recommendations).
177.
Kidd, supra note 174.
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regulatory reforms. A few studies have looked at the performance of the
specific firms that were signatories to the Global Research Settlement, and
those studies have reported mixed results. A 2005 study by Investars.com
reported improvement by many of the firms that were part of the settlement
and found that the stock picks by nine of the twelve firms had outperformed
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 over a one-year period.178 Another report,
looking at comparable data from Investars.com, found that the performance
of five of ten settling banks improved during the 2003–2005 time period,
but the performance of the other five declined.179 Leslie Boni found that
after the settlement, analyst-recommended stocks outperformed the market,
but more often than not, stocks receiving the analysts’ worst ratings
outperformed those receiving the strongest recommendations.180
The effect of mandated independence cannot be evaluated solely by
studying the effect of the new rules on analyst optimism or bias. Regulators state that the goal of recent reforms is “to improve the objectivity
of research [and to] provide investors with more useful and reliable
information.”181 Yet, for investors, forced separation of investment
banking and other conflicts from research may increase the cost or
reduce research quality, particularly if the prior performance of investment banking affiliated analysts was due in part to synergies between
investment banking and research.
B.

Increased Market Segmentation

The market is responding to the increased cost of funding research
with increased segmentation. Many firms are focusing primarily or
exclusively on providing research to institutional investors because
institutions are willing to pay for research, directly or indirectly, and an
institutional clientele reduces the analyst’s liability exposure.182 This has
led to an increased number of research firms who limit the dissemination of
their research to a few exclusive clients183 and charge a correspondingly
178.
See Jane J. Kim, Stock Research Gets More Reliable: Third-Party Reviews Suggest
Improvement in Performance of Buy-Sell Recommendations, W ALL S T . J., June 7, 2005, at D1
(describing results of Investars.com study).
179.
Barr, supra note 92.
180.
Leslie Boni, Analyzing the Analysts After the Global Settlement (Sept. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20050928_Leslie_Boni.ppt#9.
181.
Second SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153.
182.
See Schulz, supra note 8 (describing customized research created for hedge funds).
183.
See, e.g., Chesler, supra note 32 (identifying hedge funds’ interest in research but
describing the traditional research model as unviable because research is distributed too broadly).
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high fee.184 Indeed, institutions are willing to pay a substantial premium for the assurance that the research that they receive is not being
distributed broadly.185
Research firms are also developing specialized services tailored to the
needs of institutional investors. Lehman Brothers, for example, has created
“desk analysts” to sit on clients’ trading desks and provide extra research
attention for institutional investors.186 Firms are offering institutions
customized research, sometimes termed “bespoke research” that responds
to the institutional clients’ needs and instructions.187 Research firms, such
as Vista Research and Gerson Lehrman, provide contacts and access to
sources of company and industry information, including retired executives
and consultants.188 Institutions reportedly pay as much as $500,000 a year
for these contacts.189
This segmentation is a predictable result of mandated independence.
If cross-subsidization is no longer viable, firms will only provide research to
those customers who are willing to pay for it. The resulting segmentation
has the effect of aggravating the differential between retail and institutional
investor access to information. If, prior to the regulatory reforms, the smart
money got the information first, now, in many cases, retail investors do
not get the information at all. Moreover, market segmentation reduces the
ability of retail investors to benefit from reputational and other forms
of market discipline imposed by sophisticated investors.190 In many cases,
184.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32 (explaining that “the most pioneering, market-moving
research is going exclusively to big mutual funds and the private investment pools known as
hedge funds, not to the small investor”).
185.
See, e.g., Schulz, supra note 8 (stating that approximately twenty research firms operate
under this model, directing their research primarily to hedge fund clients, and charging quarterly
subscription fees of $250,000 to $350,000).
186.
See US Analysts, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at 18 (describing “desk analysts”).
187.
See Davis, supra note 32 (describing custom research projects with six-figure annual fees).
188.
Chesler, supra note 32.
189.
Id. Some critics have questioned whether the information provided through these
firms extends beyond legal bounds. See, e.g., Laurie Cohen, Private Money: The New Financial
Order; In the Know: Seeking an Edge, Big Investors Turn to Network of Informants, Mark
Gerson Assembles Web of Moonlighting Managers; Applebee’s Bars Practice; Drawing a Line at
‘Nonpublic,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A1 (detailing Gerson Lehrman’s practices in
obtaining and compensating consultants). The SEC and the New York attorney general recently
began investigating the consulting arrangements of Vista Research and Gerson Lehrman.
Gregory Zuckerman & Peter Lattman, Research Firms’ Consultant Ties Draw Scrutiny; New York,
SEC Examine Information Disclosures to Hedge Funds, Others, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at C1.
190.
The problem is analogous to the problem observed in the mutual fund area, where
segmentation limits the market’s ability to discipline fees charged by funds to less sophisticated
investors. Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1017, 1034 (2005).
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institutions are using research that is not provided to databases and services
such as Thomson First Call.191
Retail investors are also losing access to top analysts. The regulatory reforms led many financial firms to reduce greatly the compensation
paid to analysts—a natural response to the inability of analysts to participate in investment banking.192 At the same time, many firms cut their
research budgets. The combination of these responses led many top
analysts to leave sell-side firms.193 Some struck out on their own, offering
their research on an exclusive basis to institutional clients.194 Others
moved to investment banking,195 to the buy side, or to hedge funds.196
To the extent that buy-side research is substituting for sell-side research,
there are additional reasons for concern. First, the substitution is likely
to result in duplicative research, as multiple institutions substitute their
own internal research for reliance on a single sell-side analyst. Second,
empirical evidence suggests that buy-side research may be both less
accurate and more optimistic than sell-side research.197 Accordingly, to the
extent that institutions are reducing their reliance on sell-side analysts, that
reduction may come at a cost.

191.
See, e.g., Pam Abramowitz, Sink or Swim: Demand for Independent Research Is Up,
but Supply Is Up Even More, 40 E UROMONEY I NSTITUTIONAL I NVESTOR 77 (Dec. 1, 2006)
(describing Telsey Advisory Group’s clients as having “exclusive access” to the firm’s research
because it is not disseminated to First Call or other public sources).
192.
See, e.g., Mylene Mangalindan, Oracle Hires Software Analyst, WALL ST. J., May 16,
2003, at B2 (explaining that “many veterans in equity research are facing lower salaries and an
image tarnished by conflict-of-interest scandals”).
193.
See, e.g., Beth Piskora, Age of Analysts Comes to Close, N.Y. POST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 20
(describing how established analysts are leaving investment banks as a result of the regulatory reforms).
194.
See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 191 (describing how many veteran analysts have left
investment banks to “strike out on their own”).
195.
See Emily Thornton, Wall Street’s Research Conundrum, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 2002, at
120 (describing why investment banks need to keep top analysts as part of their investment
banking teams, and predicting that “most talented and experienced analysts are likely to
metamorphose into bankers, who earn roughly twice what they do”).
196.
See, e.g., Hulus Alpay & Gene Marbach, Sell-Side Coverage Remains as Elusive as
Ever, O’DWYER’S PR SERVICES REP., Jan. 2007, at 14 (stating that “analysts have been leaving
the sell-side to join the buy-side and hedge funds”); Chris Hughes, Rubinstein Jumps Ship for
Hedge Fund, F IN. T IMES, June 22, 2006, at 22 (describing the departure of several sell-side
analysts to hedge funds).
197.
Boris Groysberg et al., Do Buy-Side Analysts Out-Perform the Sell-Side? 45 (Working
Paper, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=806264 (finding that the buy-side firm
analysts made markedly more optimistic and less accurate earnings forecasts than their sellside counterparts, even after controlling for analyst- and firm-specific factors). The authors
found that sell-side recommendations were more optimistic, but that the lesser optimism of
buy-side analysts did not translate into improved return performance. Id. They concluded
that the shift toward greater use of buy-side research may not be desirable. Id. at 34.
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Retail investors are simply receiving less information. The number of
sell-side analysts employed by investment banks has declined drastically in
response to the regulatory reforms.198 Those analysts who remain are
focusing on large-cap companies, leaving many small-cap companies
without any research coverage.199 In its 2006 report to the SEC, the
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies reported that
“approximately 1,200 of 3,200 of NASDAQ-listed companies, and 35% of
all public companies, receive no analyst coverage at all.”200 For companies
with market capitalizations of less than $125 million, the number with no
analyst coverage increases to 83 percent.201 Reuters found that since 2002
alone, 691 companies lost coverage altogether.202 In addition, the combination of the independence mandate plus the quiet period means that a
substantial number of new IPOs, particularly of small-cap companies, are
not receiving any research coverage.203
The Global Research Settlement provided a substantial, albeit temporary, research subsidy designed in part to mitigate these effects by filling
the gap in coverage with more independent research. As a result of the
settlement, the defendant banks are collectively required to spend $432.5
million over a five-year period to purchase independent research for
their customers.204 The effect of this subsidy on independent research
198.
See, e.g., Ken Brown, Stock Research Goes From Frothy to Frugal, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2003, at C1 (describing research cuts by Wall Street firms); Andrew Capon, Research Less Besmirched,
EUROMONEY, June 1, 2006, at 70 (citing National Research Exchange statistics indicating that
the number of analysts at Wall Street firms fell by 30 percent from 2001 to 2005); Marie Leone,
The Flight of the Sell-Side Analyst, CFO.COM, July 8, 2004, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/
3015019?f=options (estimating a drop in the number of sell-side analysts at 15 to 20 percent).
199.
Thor Valdmanis, Few Believe $1.4 Billion Deal Will Change Wall Street, USA
TODAY, Apr. 29, 2003, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/
2003-04-29-settle-cover_x.htm (quoting Zacks Investment Research as reporting a 23 percent
increase since 2000 in the number of issuers with no coverage); Spelman Research, Independent
Investment Research, http://www.spelmanresearch.com/learn-about-investment-research.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (claiming that four out of five companies with market caps of $100
million have no analyst coverage).
200.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 65 n.126.
201.
Id. (citing 2004 statistics provided by SEC Office of Economic Analysis).
202.
Susanne Craig, Moving the Market: Firm to Research Stock “Orphans,” WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 2005, at C3.
203.
IPOHome, Renaissance Capital Study Shows IPOs Are Losing Research Coverage,
http://www.ipohome.com/press/iporesearch.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (describing the absence
of coverage for new IPOs).
204.
See Joint Press Release, NASAA, NASD, NYAG, NYSE, & SEC, Ten of Nation’s Top
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research
and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
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remains unclear, as the market continues to adjust to effects of the new
regulatory structure. Media reports indicate that, although the prospect of
obtaining money from the settlement spawned the growth of a number
of small or boutique research firms, many new firms have been struggling
since the Wall Street banks chose mostly the larger, independent firms
to provide their independent research.205 As the Wall Street Journal
reported, now that the “initial burst of interest” in independent research is
over, “some independents are getting out, and others are seeing their
business decline.”206 On the other hand, the most recent report from
Institutional Investor indicated that the number of firms offering independent research has quadrupled since 2003, and that although some of
the best firms have been driven from the business, others have emerged to
take their place.207
The value of the subsidized research is also unclear. Even with this
substantial budget, the banks cannot duplicate the research available to
institutions because many independent analysts are unwilling to disseminate their research broadly, fearing that participation in the settlement will
affect the ability to keep their institutional clients.208 Critics also argue that
the quality of the free research is low because banks are unwilling to pay
more for research aimed at sophisticated investors.209 Reports on investor
use of the subsidized research are mixed; some media reports indicate that
investors are making limited use of the independent research.210
Industry insiders indicate that “when the five years [of the subsidy]
are up, the climate may not be so favorable for the independents.”211
205.
See Judith Burns, Independent Research Hits Snags: Business Isn’t Bustling as SEC May
Move to Curb Soft Dollar Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C15 (citing a 20 to 30
percent reduction in the industry).
206.
Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Why Independent Research Is Drying Up, WALL ST. J., Mar.
8, 2006, at C1.
207.
See Abramowitz, supra note 191, at 77.
208.
See Valdmanis, supra note 199, at 1B (quoting several independent firms as stating
that their research was inappropriate for retail investors or that participation in the settlement
would detract from the value of their research and cost them institutional clients).
209.
See Eisinger, supra note 206, at C1.
210.
See Burns, supra note 10, at B3.
211.
Chris Kentouris, Seeking Soft Dollar Clarity, SEC. I NDUSTRY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006,
at 4, 4. The SEC removed one substantial risk when it decided not to require that institutions
pay cash for third-party research rather than bundling those payments with their brokerage commissions through the use of soft dollars. See Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,993 (July 24, 2006). Commentators
had warned that the proposal “would cripple the independent research industry.” Christopher
Oster, Small Researchers Face a Threat; Mutual-Fund Industry Proposal on “Soft-Dollars” Could
End Revenue Source, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2003, at D9 (quoting The Alliance in Support of
Independent Research, a trade group).
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Independent analysts may simply lack the capacity to provide sufficient
information to the market.212 Most independent firms cover a small number
of companies, and their financial structures do not allow them to pay Wall
Street levels of analyst compensation.213 Typically, they cannot compete
with investment banks on features such as offering access to management.214
Tellingly, despite the reputational fallout from the analyst scandals, the
settlement subsidy, and the ongoing changes in the industry, Wall Street
firms still provide more than 95 percent of all research coverage.215
The extent to which analysts who are not affiliated with investment banks can properly be characterized as independent also remains
uncertain.216 As this Article has demonstrates, so-called independent
analysts may have a variety of business relationships that compromise
their objectivity.217 Many so-called independent analysts are affiliated with
mutual funds, and these alliances may lead them to be overly optimistic
with respect to securities within the funds’ portfolios.218 Analysts who serve
institutional clients face continued pressure to maintain ratings that
are favorable to the client’s investment position.219 Several independent
analysts who sell research to hedge funds have recently been accused of
212.
See, e.g., Cheryl Winokur Munk & Lynn Cowan, The Stock-Research Pact:
Independent Firms Aim to Divide Spoils, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at C9 (describing how only the
largest independent firms offer coverage anywhere close to that offered by the Wall Street
investment banks); Randall Smith, Quality of Morningstar’s Research May Suffer, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 2004, at C1 (describing the claim that Morningstar would not be able to maintain
research quality as it stretched coverage to meet the demands of the settlement).
213.
Smith, supra note 212, at C1 (quoting a letter sent to the federal judge overseeing the
settlement as stating that Morningstar analysts were receiving only $22,000 extra to double their
coverage, an amount “far below typical compensation standards for investment research”).
214.
See, e.g., Kentouris, supra note 211 (identifying differences in research approach and
financial structure between Wall Street firms and independent analysts).
215.
Valdmanis, supra note 199, at 1B.
216.
Some independent firms have attempted to provide greater assurance of their
independence. For example, Investorside Research Association has come up with a certified
provider seal. The seal certifies that member firms are “free of investment banking, consulting,
and research-for-hire conflicts.” See Investorside Research Association, http://www.investorside.org/
about_us/index.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (describing Investorside certification).
217.
See generally Choi & Fisch, supra note 13, at 284–86 (describing various business
relationships that can compromise the objectivity of so-called independent analysts).
218.
See, e.g., Davis & Craig, supra note 21, at C1 (describing how mutual fund Alliance
Capital’s ownership of research firm Sanford C. Bernstein could compromise independence of
Sanford C. Bernstein’s research); Randall Smith & Ann Davis, Dark Horse Leads Stock-Research
Sweepstakes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at C1 (reporting that the size of Alliance’s trading
operation has disqualified Sanford C. Bernstein from qualifying as independent for purposes of the Global Research Settlement).
219.
Davis & Craig, supra note 21, at C1 (reporting statements by analysts that
pressure from institutional clients has grown as trading business becomes a bigger factor in
analyst compensation).
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disseminating overly pessimistic information in an effort to make the
funds’ short selling more profitable.220 Other independent firms trade
covered securities on a proprietary basis.221 Even the independence of
Morningstar, one of the prime beneficiaries of the Global Research
Settlement and a major source of research for the participating investment
banks, has come under scrutiny for conflicts of interest between its research
and the financial and consulting services that it provides to issuers.222
The regulatory reforms have a limited impact on potential conflicts
that do not involve investment banking. The Street.com Ratings reported,
for example, that proprietary trading represented the single largest source
of revenue for the defendant banks that participated in the Global
Research Settlement, yet the settlement does not address the incentive
for analysts to release favorable information on securities owned by the
banks in order to enhance the profitability of that trading.223 The SRO
rules require only limited disclosure of noninvestment banking conflicts,
and that disclosure focuses primarily on proprietary trading by individual
analysts.224 More importantly, because the regulatory reforms have been
implemented through SRO rules (and the Global Research Settlement),
they do not apply to all research analysts. In particular, the SRO rules
apply only to NYSE and NASD member firms and their employees.
Research-only firms that do not function as brokers or dealers are not
subject to the regulations.
One might reasonably question whether any of these effects matter.
Of what importance is a reduction in the amount of sell-side coverage,
particularly if it was of little value to retail investors? Institutional investors
220.
See, e.g., Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their
Relationships? Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (testimony of
Marc Kasowitz, Senior Partner, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP, Alliance for
Investment Transparency) (describing a “a pattern of egregious collusion between certain
influential hedge funds and certain supposedly independent analysts” in which research is
“bought and paid for by the hedge funds”); Jenny Anderson, True or False: A Hedge
Fund Plotted to Hurt a Drug Maker?, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 3, at 1 (describing allegations that hedge fund clients are influencing the content of research disseminated by
independent analysts).
221.
Matthew Goldstein, Second Curve: Hedge Fund on the Edge, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
Apr. 18, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com (describing writing by analyst Thomas
Brown on his bankstocks.com website about stocks owned by his hedge fund).
222.
John Spence, Morningstar Focus of Spitzer Inquiry, CBS M ARKET W ATCH. COM ,
Dec. 16, 2004.
223.
MARTIN D. WEISS, RESEARCH ANALYST REFORMS AND THE SETTLEMENT: WHY
REFORMS DON’T ADEQUATELY PROTECT INVESTORS (2003), available at http://www.weissratings.com/
settlement.asp.
224.
See supra notes 152–165 and accompanying text (describing SRO rules).
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can continue to purchase research and trade on it. From a consumerprotection standpoint, investors may be better off with no information than
with information that is false or misleading.
A partial answer to this question is that the explicit purpose of the
regulatory reforms was to provide investors with reliable information and
to enhance the role of research analysts as gatekeepers.225 Congress, the
SEC, and even the U.S. Supreme Court have identified a valuable role for
research analysts in disseminating information to the market and increasing market efficiency.226 If the reforms cannot achieve this objective, it
is difficult to justify them. Furthermore, to the extent that regulatory
reforms further segment the market for investment information, small
investors will likely be forced to rely on inferior information sources. I
have questioned elsewhere the competence of regulators to identify and
control investor use of information, but the proven willingness of investors
to rely on sources such as anonymous chat room postings and emails
should caution the SEC about shutting down traditional research.227
Moreover, the changes in the research market have not reduced
what might have been characterized as excessive coverage; rather, they
have eliminated coverage for a distinct set of issuers—new and smaller
companies. The absence of research coverage increases the cost of capital
for these firms.228 The higher cost of capital in turn reduces the ability
of small firms to finance business opportunities. Large institutional
investors are less interested in investing in smaller companies because
of their concerns over information asymmetries and liquidity constraints.
Although analyst coverage mediates these concerns, the smaller trading
225.
See, e.g., SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts
of Interest (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm
(describing the analyst’s role as a “gatekeeper”).
226.
See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983) (“The SEC expressly recognized
that ‘[t]he value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information, and thus the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of all investors.’” (quoting In re
Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
227.
See Fisch, supra note 76, at 70–71 (describing investor reliance on websites, chat
rooms, and phony telephone messages).
228.
See, e.g., Robert M. Bowen et al., Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity
Capital: Evidence From Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings 5 (Sauder Sch. of Bus.
Working Paper, Jan. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=417860 (finding that “greater
analyst coverage is associated with a significantly lower cost of raising equity capital”); see
also Stephen Taub, Analyst (Un)coverage Hurting Small Firms, CFO. COM , July 16, 2004,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3015231 (reporting a National Bureau of Economics Research
finding that “[t]he decline in analyst coverage of small companies has cost those businesses
roughly 138 basis points per year”).
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volume of these issuers makes it uneconomic for brokerage-affiliated or
pure research analysts to sell research on these companies. Significantly,
subsidizing research through investment banking revenues had offered
a realistic solution by creating an economic rationale for Wall Street
firms to cover smaller issuers.
D.

Issuer-Financed Research

Some small issuers have responded to the lack of analyst coverage
by paying analysts directly.229 Issuer-paid research, or “pay to play,” seems
to be a natural market-based response to the reduced coverage of small
issuers. Several research firms are marketing their research services
directly to issuers, claiming that their coverage will improve liquidity and
stock price.230 Dutton Associates, one of the largest issuer-paid firms,
charges $39,500, prepaid, for a year of coverage, which consists of four
quarterly reports.231 Spelman Research, charges $26,500, also prepaid, for
a research report, which it distributes to 50,000 industry professionals, as
well as a year of coverage.232 Investrend Research provides a similar type
of fee-based research, and claims that its analysts are paid to deliver
reports “to the benefit of the public.”233
Issuer-paid research has been highly controversial.234 Defenders claim
that fee-based providers are free of the highly criticized investmentbanking, brokerage, and other business conflicts. Critics argue that
commissioned research is inherently conflicted. The need to generate
business from other issuers clearly gives commissioned research firms an
incentive to provide optimistic reports rather than to be critical of covered
229.
See Susanne Craig, Stock Analysis: Left Out of Shrinking Research Pool, Companies Resort
to Buying Coverage, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2003, at C1 (describing the increasing use by issuers of
purchased coverage).
230.
See FIRST Research Consortium, http://www.firstresearchconsortium.com/members.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (listing member firms who provide fee-based research to issuers).
Significantly, the costs of issuer-paid research are far less than the $165,000 to $185,000 it costs a
Wall Street firm annually to cover a stock. John Dutton, Small Cap Strategy, CALIFORNIA CEO,
Winter 2006, at 13, 13, available at http://www.jmdutton.com/PDF_Files/CaCEO-1206.pdf.
231.
See Headline Maker: Dutton Associates Announces Qiao Xing Universal Telephone
Raised to Strong Buy Rating, I NVESTORS. COM , January 17, 2007, http://www.investors.com/
breakingnews.asp?journal=47899882 (describing the services offered by Dutton Associates).
232.
Spelman Research, supra note 199.
233.
Essary, supra note 61, at 2.
234.
See, e.g., SEC Told ‘No Crisis in Disclosure,’ but Non-Disclosures Almost Daily Now,
F INANCIALW IRE , Sept. 10, 2004 [hereinafter No Crisis], available at http://www.investors.com/
breakingnews.asp?journalid=23034610&brk=1 (describing concerns about the adequacy of the
disclosure that research is paid for by the issuer).
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companies or their management, leading some to call such analysts indistinguishable from stock promoters. The Wall Street Journal recently
observed that Dutton has buy-type ratings on 77.5 percent of the stocks it
covers; Thomson Financial reports that, in the aggregate, 46.5 percent
of analyst ratings are buys.235 Some fee-based research has been distributed
without full disclosure that it was paid for by the issuer,236 and some
firms own stock in covered companies.237 Concerns about the reliability of
issuer-paid research have led Thomson Financial to begin excluding paidfor research from its consensus earnings and recommendations,238 although
seven firms, including Dutton, were “grandfathered in” and continue to
contribute research on 145 companies.239
A number of issuer-paid providers have attempted to address concerns
about the reliability of issuer-paid research by banding together into the
FIRST Research Consortium.240 The Consortium issued standards for
independent research providers that include various measures of independence, full disclosure of financial considerations, and the requirement that
analysts not own or trade covered securities.241 Similar guidelines were
jointly released by the CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity and the
National Investor Relations Institute.242 The extent to which analysts will
adhere to these standards—which are not binding—remains unclear.243
235.
Karen Richardson, In Quiet Niche, Paid-for Stock Research Persists, W ALL ST . J.,
Dec. 13, 2006, at C1.
236.
See, e.g., No Crisis, supra note 234. SEC Regulation 17(b) requires analysts who
provide research for compensation to disclose that compensation, but it is unclear whether
the regulation requires similar disclosure by the issuer itself when it distributes the analyst’s
report. See id. In addition, analyst compensation may not be disclosed when investors access
the analyst’s research through sites such as Yahoo! Finance or Thomson Financial. Richardson,
supra note 235, at C1.
237.
See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 235, at C1 (describing coverage of Qiao Xing
Universal Telephone by two issuer-paid analysts, one of which owned $20,000 worth of
company stock).
238.
See Veronica Belitski, Thomson Financial Snubs Paid-for Researchers; First Domino?,
WALL STREET LETTER, Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation
2005 WLNR 6883086) (reporting Thomson Financial’s decision to exclude issuer-paid research
providers from First Call and I/B/E/S databases).
239.
Richardson, supra note 235, at C1.
240.
FIRST Research Consortium, Standards of Practice for Research Providers,
http://www.firstresearchconsortium.com/standards.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
241.
Id.
242.
CFA CTR . FOR F IN. MKT . I NTEGRITY & N AT ’ L I NVESTOR R ELATIONS I NST .,
B EST P RACTICE G UIDELINES G OVERNING A NALYST /C ORPORATE I SSUER R ELATIONS
(2004), http://www.niri.org/irresource_pubs/pdfs/CFAI-NIRIGuidelines.pdf.
243.
See, e.g., CFAI-NIRI ‘Analyst-Issuer Best Practices Guidelines’ Violated Within 4 Hours
of Release, F INANCIALW IRE, Dec. 9. 2004, available at http://www.investrend.com/articles/
article.asp?analystId=0&id=12139&topicId=160&level=160 (describing the publication of
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In 2005, Reuters and NASDAQ created a joint venture called the
Independent Research Network (IRN).244 The IRN was designed to act
as an intermediary between independent research providers and issuers.245
Under the IRN model, issuers pay the IRN for coverage and the IRN
selects the research providers, who are not then in the awkward position
of critically evaluating the firm and managers that have selected them.246
The explicit objective of the IRN was to mitigate analyst conflicts of
interest.247 Regulators determined that under certain conditions, the IRN
would be allowed to serve as an independent research provider under the
terms of the Global Research Settlement.248 The market did not appear,
however, to accept the model.249 Reuters recently announced that the IRN
was being shut down “due to weak demand from investors.”250

V.

AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACH

The foregoing analysis suggests that efforts by regulators to improve
information quality in the capital markets have had predictable and
undesirable effects. Current regulations were premised upon a link between
analyst conflicts and research quality that is not borne out by empirical
research. More recent studies fail to demonstrate that mandatory
independence has made research more reliable. The market for research
has become increasingly segmented; institutional investors have access to
highly sophisticated and costly information sources, while retail investors
are receiving less information than ever. At the same time, the reforms
have dramatically reduced coverage of small issuers, making it more difficult
for them to access the public capital markets. As this Article explains, given
Spelman’s research of issuer Consortium Service Management Group without disclosing
that the issuer had paid for the research).
244.
Finextra.com, Reuters and Nasdaq Form JV to Deliver Independent Analysis (June 7,
2005), http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=13786.
245.
Id.; see also Paid Research You Can Trust?, BUS. WK., Oct. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf20050930_5622_db008.htm (describing
the Independent Research Network’s (IRN) role as an intermediary in an interview with IRN
president, Daniel Blank).
246.
Paid Research You Can Trust?, supra note 245.
247.
Id.
248.
Karen Richardson, Research Providers Get Green Light—Some ‘Independent’ Firms Will
Be Allowed to Work With Clients on Coverage, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2005, at C5.
249.
See Fixing Wall Street Research Years After Global Settlement, Critics Say Conflicts Remain,
W ALL ST . J., Nov. 12, 2006 (quoting Jonathan Boersma as stating that “it is yet to be seen if
these models will take hold”).
250.
Finextra.com, Reuters and Nasdaq to Shut Down Independent Research Network
(Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=17423.
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the economic structure of equity research, there is little reason to believe
that high-quality objective research can be provided to public investors
on a cost-effective basis absent subsidization of that research through business relationships that potentially compromise analyst independence.
One possible solution is to provide alternative sources of research
financing. In prior work with Stephen Choi, I argued for a system of
issuer-based financing that would place control over resource allocation in
the hands of shareholders.251 The IRN reflected a similar approach, although
it lacked our proposal’s market discipline over research quality.
If the markets are to rely on third-party providers both to supply
research and to finance that research, then a mandate of analyst
independence is unrealistic. Based on existing evidence, it is also
unnecessary. Instead, the solution is to manage rather than eliminate
so-called conflicts of interest. This Part introduces a two-part mechanism
for managing analyst conflicts. Subpart V.A proposes a requirement of
analyst registration. Subpart V.B describes the creation of a new SEC
Analyst Website, SECAW.
This Article advocates SECAW as an alternative regulatory approach
that would substitute for the existing government-mandated independence.
For institutional investors, neither the current regulatory restrictions
nor SECAW are necessary; institutional investors can adequately address
analyst conflicts by contract. For retail investors, the disclosure effected
through SECAW addresses collective action problems and provides
increased transparency. In addition, by increasing the reliability of analyst
research, by allowing firms to subsidize that research through other,
properly disclosed business operations, and by lowering the costs of
disseminating that research broadly, the proposal is likely to increase
coverage of small issuers. Finally, the markets as a whole will benefit
from better information with which to judge the value of research.
A. Analyst Registration
Registration is a commonly used tool in securities regulation. The
Securities Act of 1933252 introduced the registration requirement—a
cornerstone in the regulation of the securities markets—in connection with
the public offering process. As Louis Brandeis explained in support of
the disclosure-based approach to regulation: “Sunlight is said to be the
251.
252.

Choi & Fisch, supra note 13.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000).
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best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”253 Felix
Frankfurter, who was largely responsible for overseeing the creation of
the federal regulatory scheme, embraced this philosophy and used it as
the basis of federal securities regulation.254 Although the disclosurebased regime has been criticized,255 it is widely credited with “improved
selection of new investment projects, improved managerial performance,
and reduced investor risk.”256 As Merritt Fox observed, despite repeated
debates over whether market forces will produce an optimal level of
disclosure without regulation, “even most economics-oriented legal
academics” conclude that mandatory disclosure is desirable.257
The registration requirement has been extended beyond issuers; the
Investment Company Act of 1940258 requires mutual funds to register with
the SEC and to disclose their investment positions and financial
condition.259 Registration is also used to regulate securities professionals.
Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934260 requires brokerdealers to register with the SEC.261 The Investment Advisors Act of 1940262
requires nonexempt investment advisors to register.263
Research analysts are not now and never have been subject to a
registration requirement. Although many analysts are employed by registered broker-dealers, the broker-dealer disclosure requirements are not
tailored to specific issues concerning analyst reliability and performance,

253.
L OUIS D. B RANDEIS, O THER P EOPLE ’ S M ONEY AND H OW THE B ANKERS U SE I T
92 (1914).
254.
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governance at the End of History, L AW & C ONTEMP . PROBS ., Autumn 2004, at 109, 113–14.
255.
See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 420–30 (2003) (criticizing existing
disclosure requirements as excessive).
256.
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1999).
257.
Id. at 1339.
258.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, 80a-29 (2000).
259.
Id.
260.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2000).
261.
Id. Registration also subjects brokers to various requirements regarding recordkeeping,
financial reporting, and net capital. See Alexander C. Dill, Broker-Dealer Regulation Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Case of Independent Contracting, 1994 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 189, 208–22 (describing the importance of a broker-dealer registration requirement
in enabling oversight of the financial services industry); see also David A. Lipton, A Primer on
Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899 (1987) (describing registration requirements).
262.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000).
263.
Id.; see Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“By keeping a census of
advisers, the Commission can better respond to, initiate, and take remedial action on complaints
against fraudulent advisers.”).
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nor is broker-dealer disclosure made at the level of individual analysts.264
Additionally, these requirements do not apply to analysts who are not
employed by broker-dealers.
Registration is less intrusive than substantive regulation.265 By
establishing a registration requirement, the SEC can more easily monitor
the accuracy and completeness of conflict disclosure.266 Allowing analysts
to disclose rather than eliminate conflicts would enable firms to crosssubsidize research through other business activities, including investment
banking and brokerage. At the same time, disclosure would allow the
market, rather than the regulators, to evaluate the extent to which these
activities compromise the quality or integrity of the research.
Congress could impose a registration requirement by statute, but this
Article advocates that the SEC exercise its rulemaking authority to
require analyst registration. Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
explicitly authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules addressed to analyst
conflicts of interest.267 Importantly, the statute is not, by its terms, limited
to investment banking conflicts or to analysts affiliated with investment
banks or broker dealers. Thus, by promulgating a registration requirement
under the authority of section 501, the SEC could identify and address
conflicts involving unaffiliated or “independent” analysts—analysts who
fall outside the scope of the current regulations.
Because, as indicated above,268 institutional investors do not require
regulatory protection from analyst conflicts of interest, this Article
proposes that the registration requirement apply only to analysts who
provide their research to the investing public, directly or indirectly.
Analysts who provide research directly to the public by releasing reports
or recommendations to the media, appearing on talk shows, or posting
264.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1056–57 (describing regulation of analysts
employed by broker-dealers).
265.
See, e.g., Letter from Rebecca McEnally, Vice President, CFA Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkt.
Integrity, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s73004/rmcenally093004.pdf (commenting, in the context of a proposed
hedge fund registration, that registration requirements have increasingly widespread acceptance in the securities industry, impose a relatively minimal burden on firms, and offer
valuable increased transparency).
266.
The SEC justified its hedge fund registration requirement (Hedge Fund Rule) on this
basis, stating that registration would enable oversight and the identification of conflicts
without impeding legitimate hedge fund investment activities. See Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). The D.C. Circuit recently invalidated the Hedge Fund Rule as
inconsistent with the Investment Advisors Act. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
267.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
268.
See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
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information on a publicly accessible website, blog, or chat room, would be
required to register. Analysts who provide research to an intermediary
such as Thomson First Call or directly to an issuer, would be required to
register if the intermediary will release the information to the public. The
registration requirement would further apply to analysts who release
information to a sufficiently large number of customers or subscribers
that the information will foreseeably make its way into the public domain
and affect the securities markets. A reasonable threshold would require
registration by analysts who disseminate information to one thousand
or more investors.269 Analysts who provide research exclusively to their
employers, such as those analysts employed by mutual funds or hedge
funds, as well as analysts who provide research to a limited number of
institutional clients, would not be required to register.
What would the registration requirement entail? The primary
objective of the registration requirement would be to obtain disclosure
of any business relationships by the analyst or the analyst’s employer that
could potentially influence the analyst’s research. As detailed earlier in
this Article,270 those business relationships include investment banking,
brokerage, asset management (directly or through affiliates), and proprietary trading. In addition to requiring that the analyst identify himself or
herself and the analyst’s employer, the registration requirement would
require the analyst to identify all such business relationships in which
the analyst or the analyst’s employer is engaged. The analyst would also
be required to provide a breakdown, by revenue, of how the firm’s research
and brokerage services are distributed between retail and institutional
clients, to describe special services provided to institutional investors, and
to identify whether the firm receives payment in the form of soft dollars.
The analyst would be required to disclose pending and prior disputes
concerning the accuracy of his or her research and any allegations of a
failure to disclose conflicts of interest—this disclosure would include
litigation and customer arbitration proceedings. Finally, the analyst would
be required to identify any other material business relationships.
The information provided through the registration process would be
made available to investors and the markets through the SECAW, as set
forth in Subpart V.B below. It would also enable the SEC to gain a better
understanding of the market structure by providing information on analysts
269.
A catchall provision could require registration by other analysts who disseminate
information in a manner targeted to or calculated to reach the investing public.
270.
See supra Subpart I.B.
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outside the traditional investment banking and brokerage firms who
disseminate research to public investors.
B.

SECAW: The SEC Analyst Website

The second component of this Article’s proposal for managing analyst conflicts of interest is the creation of a research analyst website.
The Article proposes that the SEC create a website providing the public
with access both to the information provided through the analyst
registration process and to current and historical analyst research.271 The
website, known as SECAW, would provide investors and the market with
a single public source for information about analysts, their recommendations, and potential conflicts of interest. The website would enable
investors to track down and evaluate information disseminated through
talk show appearances, chat rooms, and press reports. In addition, the
website would serve as a source of historical information, enabling
the market more readily to evaluate analyst performance.
SECAW would contain three types of information. First, SECAW
would contain background information and business relationships relating
to each individual analyst, which would be obtained from the analyst’s
registration filing. Second, analysts would be required to post realtime information concerning any recommendation, earnings estimate, or
price target disseminated directly or indirectly to the public.272 This
posting would be required on the first date that the information is released
to the public and would include the opening price of the covered
security on the date of the posting. Analysts would not be required to
post their full research reports, but would be required to disclose whether
a report had been prepared and to identify those to whom the report is
available, such as customers or subscribers.
Third, analysts would be required to list any relationships specific to
the covered company, including prior employment, whether the company
has been an investment banking client within the past year, and whether
the firm has pitched for investment banking business within the past year.
To address the differential treatment of institutional and individual
271.
Funding for SECAW could come from imposing a modest fee in connection with
the registration requirement.
272.
The definition of public dissemination would be consistent with that used in the
registration requirement, see supra Subpart V.A, and would include dissemination of research
to one thousand or more customers, as well as any dissemination reasonably calculated to reach
the investing public.
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investors, the analyst would be required to disclose whether the analyst or
its firm provided the posted information to any clients prior to its public
release and, if so, to identify the date that the posted information had
first been provided to clients. The analyst would have to identify any
personal ownership of or derivative positions in the covered securities,
and any personal trading within a six-month period prior to the posting.
The analyst’s firm would also be required to disclose whether it has a
proprietary position (long or short) in the covered securities and the
approximate size of that position.
SECAW would be maintained in such a way as to provide both
current and historical information about analyst research. Analyst postings would be retained on the site for a twelve-month period, enabling the
market to evaluate performance of prior recommendations, consistency,
and changes in coverage. Analysts and their firms would also be required
to identify any changes to the posted information on a real-time basis.
Thus, if a firm, subsequent to the analyst’s posting, purchased covered
securities or was retained to perform investment banking services, that
information would be added to the website. Similarly, individual analysts would be able to sell covered securities, such as for liquidity reasons,
without running afoul of the current prohibition on trading inconsistent
with a recommendation.273
The mechanics of the website could be handled by establishing an
account for each individual analyst in connection with the registration
process. Once the SEC set up the account, analysts could be given the
ability to post their research directly to the website. This mechanism would
reduce the administrative costs of the website and facilitate prompt
market access to the information. Incorporation of a standard search
engine would allow users of the site to obtain information on individual
analysts, compare analyst information on specific securities, and track
analyst performance over time.

273.
This would address the problem apparently faced by Brad Hintz, who seemingly wanted
to realize substantial gains and diversify his portfolio, but was unable to do so because of the
firm’s favorable rating on the subject securities. Press Release, NASD, Sanford C. Bernstein &
Co., Research Analyst Brad Hintz Fined $550,000 for Violations of Research Analyst Conflict of
Interest Rules (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/
2006NewsReleases/NASDW_015940.
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The Advantages of SECAW

SECAW would greatly increase information flow to public investors.
It would enable investors to verify research, identify potential conflicts
of interest, and evaluate analyst performance. In particular, SECAW
would respond to the fact that retail investors often obtain access to
analyst research through secondary sources: television shows, press
reports, or the Internet. Current disclosure requirements are largely
tied to analyst’s formal report—but an individual investor may learn of
the analyst’s recommendation or price target without ever seeing that
report and thus without learning of potential conflicts of interest. SECAW
would offer the investor a single reliable source to verify the reported
information, identify potential conflicts, and review the analyst’s track
record with respect to other recommendations.
SECAW could also be used to increase investor information concerning
bundled or consensus recommendations. A number of organizations, most
prominently Thomson Financial’s First Call, bundle analyst recommendations and forecasts together to produce a consensus figure that is then
disseminated broadly to public investors without information on the
individual analysts who have supplied the underlying information.274
Investors using the consensus figures do not know the composition of
the analysts whose forecasts were combined, the conflicts or business
relationships that those analysts might have, or the performance history
of the analysts.275 One solution might involve requiring Thomson and
similar services to identify, by name, the analysts whose recommendations
are included in its consensus figures. Investors could then obtain detailed
information about those analysts from SECAW. This approach would
relieve Thomson of any obligation to collect and disclose analyst-specific
information to investors.
SECAW would facilitate the market’s ability to evaluate research
quality and analyst performance. It would enable private service providers
to compile information on analyst performance by giving those service
274.
See Green, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining the methodology used by Thomson to compile
consensus figures).
275.
Thomson, for example, accepts forecasts from any analyst who works for a major
brokerage firm. PAUL GLASSERMAN & COSTIS MAGLARAS, ANALYZING THE ANALYSTS 2
(2001), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pglasserman/B6014/TheAnalysts.pdf.
Thomson does not, however, include research from issuer-paid analysts, except for a few firms
that were grandfathered in. See Belitski, supra note 238 (describing Thomson’s exclusion of
issuer-paid research); Richardson, supra note 235, at C1 (describing Thomson’s decision to
continue including research provided by Dutton and several other firms).
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providers a comprehensive source of analyst recommendations. Importantly,
SECAW would offer a new and centralized source of data on the quality
and value of publicly distributed research. With this data, investors could
better determine the extent to which they should base their investment
decisions on analyst recommendations, and regulators could better appraise
the extent to which equity research enhances market efficiency.
SECAW would also allow the market and academic researchers to
evaluate the effect of analyst conflicts and business relationships. The D.C.
Circuit recently struck down the SEC’s rules requiring greater independence of mutual fund directors, criticizing the factual predicate of the SEC’s
rulemaking.276 In particular, the court found that the SEC had failed
adequately to consider the costs of its new rules and to evaluate a
disclosure-only alternative.277 Mandated analyst independence has been
imposed through a combination of SRO rules and the Global Research
Settlement and is therefore not subject to the same type of procedural
attack. Nonetheless, as discussed in Part II above, the empirical evidence
to date has failed to establish a strong justification for mandated independence.278 SECAW responds directly to this deficiency by offering
researchers access to information on a broader set of analysts as well as
detailed information on analysts’ conflicts and performance. As a result,
SECAW will enable researchers to focus specifically on the extent to which
independence is a good proxy for reliability. Ultimately, regulators will be
better able to justify the case, if any, for substantive regulation.
SECAW would also increase analyst accountability. The filing and
public disclosure requirements would increase the visibility of analyst
conflicts. This increased visibility would likely temper an analyst’s willingness to release research to further investment banking or other business
interests if that research lacked sufficient support or was inconsistent with
internal information. In addition, the historical component of the
website would counteract the market’s focus on short-term performance.
The relative permanence of historical data would also limit an analyst’s
ability to retreat from a losing position by terminating coverage.

276.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
277.
Id.
278.
See also Fisch, supra note 76, at 81 (criticizing regulators for attempting to determine
appropriate information sources for investors).
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Possible Criticisms

The combination of analyst registration and SECAW offers a
disclosure-based alternative to mandated independence. The specific
advantages of the approach advocated by this Article are increased transparency over the regulatory environment that existed in the prescandal
period, and the ability for firms to continue to subsidize research through
other business relationships. A disclosure-based system has disadvantages
as well as advantages, however. This Subpart anticipates and responds to
possible criticisms.
1.

Investor Hubris

One of the most powerful criticisms of the disclosure-based approaches
to investor protection is that disclosure is ineffective. Critics argue that
the securities laws mandate disclosure that is too extensive or complex
and that investors are incapable of evaluating the information they
receive. Behavioral economists have identified a variety of biases that
interfere with rational investor decisionmaking. Retail investors are likely
to be overconfident, causing them possibly to pay insufficient attention to
the risk that analyst conflicts of interest will cause research to be overly
optimistic. Disclosure may be a particularly ineffective response in that
overconfident investors will simply disregard warnings of these risks,
believing that they are meant for someone else.279
I have argued elsewhere that, despite the shortcomings of a disclosurebased regime, it is likely to be preferable to more paternalistic substantive
regulation.280 A more affirmative case can be made, however, in favor of
disclosure. As this Article demonstrates, the purpose of analyst regulation
is largely the protection of retail investors. As such, the regulatory scheme
can be understood in terms of consumer protection. The government’s
approach to consumer protection has relied heavily on disclosure, in
part because it operates as an adjunct to rather than as a substitute for
market discipline over price and quality, and in part because one of the
objectives of consumer protection is enhanced choice.281 Thus, for example,
279.
Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 880
(1995); see also Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 187–88
(2006) (criticizing disclosure-based securities regulation for failing to address investor irrationality).
280.
Fisch, supra note 76.
281.
James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 930–31 (2005).
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regulation of the mutual fund industry, which is mainly designed to
protect retail investors, has focused primarily on disclosure, with regulatory reforms addressed largely to enhancing investor use and understanding
of that disclosure.282
The mutual fund analogy also demonstrates one of the risks associated
with the increasing segmentation of the market for research. To the
extent that relatively informed investors participate in a market, their
knowledge and expertise enhances market discipline, which in turn allows
uninformed participants to free ride and enjoy market efficiencies. If
informed investors participate in a distinct market, however, by purchasing different products or services from those sold to retail investors, the
uninformed market may operate inefficiently.283 Thus, because SECAW
enhances the availability of sell-side research for both institutional and
retail investors, it increases the likelihood that the reputational and
other disciplines of institutional clientele will increase the incentives
for analysts to post accurate information.
2.

Regulatory Intervention Is Unnecessary

A second and powerful concern is that, if the information described
in this proposal is valuable, the market can be expected to supply that
information without regulatory intervention. Analysts at Wall Street

282.
See id. (identifying problems with investor use of investment information); cf. Eric D.
Roiter, An Apology for Mutual Funds: Delivering Fiduciary Services to Middle and Working
Class Investors, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 851, 860 (2004) (“Some issues should more
properly be seen as customer or consumer issues. The traditional approach in this respect
is promoting effective disclosure and informed choices by consumers, rather than imposition of corporate governance rules or, for that matter, creation of new fiduciary duties.”).
Concededly, the effectiveness of mutual fund disclosure has been mixed, but many of those
failures can be attributed to flaws in the disclosure process. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch,
The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 834–35 (1995) (observing
that it took the SEC twenty years to require disclosure of the identities of those persons
making investment decisions for the fund); Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J.
CORP. L. 501, 526 (2005) (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt describing mutual fund
disclosures as “impossible to understand”). Notably, studies suggest that the most problematic mutual fund investment patterns are in broker-directed investments, in which
investors appear to rely on professional advice as an alternative to reviewing disclosure.
See, e.g., Bergstresser et al., supra note 59, at 36 (finding that funds sold through brokers
have higher fees and lower returns).
283.
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1034 (2005) (suggesting that segmentation of the mutual fund
market may prevent institutional investors from disciplining fees and returns in funds marketed
primarily to retail investors).
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firms are already providing increased disclosure of their compensation
and conflicts of interest. And several firms are already supplying retail
investors with analyst ratings and other performance information.
Historically, information on analyst performance has been very
limited. Institutional Investor magazine has ranked analysts for years, but
its rankings were based on polls of institutional investors, not on actual
analyst performance.284 More recently, private organizations such as
Investars and StarMine started to compile information on analyst performance and to create analyst rating systems.285 Most of this information is only
available to institutional investors, but some is available to individual retail
investors.286 Nonetheless, retail investor access to these ratings remains
limited.287 Some data providers have reportedly refused to provide information to analyst ranking services, citing analyst reluctance to be rated.288
Many analysts are not included in the ranking services, particularly independent analysts.289 One report stated that fewer than half of the
independent analysts providing research as part of the Global Research
Settlement are publicly ranked on their performance.290 Finally, and
284.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1053 n.107 (describing the methodology of
Institutional Investor magazine’s analyst rating system); Xi Li, Performance, Herding, and Career
Concerns of Individual Financial Analysts (EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, Jan. 15,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300889 (explaining that analyst rankings are based
primarily on reputation and recognition).
285.
See Melissa Lee & John Metaxas, Quality of Analysis Gradually Improving; Firms
Publishing Accuracy of Research Predictions, CNBC, Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://www.investars.com/
articles/article30042004.asp (describing Investars as one of many firms now supplying performancebased analyst rankings).
286.
For example, Investars offers some performance information to retail investors but
its Internal Performance Measurement platform is sold to institutional clients. See Investars,
http://www.investars.com/synopsis.asp. StarMine used to provide free limited information
to retail investors, but discontinued that service in favor of selling a more complete service to
portfolio managers and other professional investors. See StarMine, http://www.starmine.com/
index.phtml?page_set=investor (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (explaining that StarMine’s analyst
rating service for individual investors has been discontinued because it was “currently focusing
[its] resources on [its] institutional-grade StarMine Professional research service”). Some of
StarMine’s information is also available free through Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/sa?s=YHOO (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
287.
A further existing limitation is that analyst ratings, when available, are not provided
to investors together with the analyst’s recommendation and report, creating search costs.
SECAW would provide a readily identifiable and reliable source of this information.
288.
See Alistair Barr, Rating the Independent Researchers; Despite Restrictions, Some
Researchers Are Tracked, CBS MARKETWATCH, Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.investars.com/
articles/article08062004-2.asp (stating that the independent firms restrict rating service access to
the necessary information if the service is going to provide ratings to retail investors).
289.
See Barr, supra note 92 (explaining that independent research providers are not
required to disclose their recommendations or their performance).
290.
Barr, supra note 288.
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perhaps most importantly, the principles described above concerning the
market for research apply equally to the market for evaluating research
quality. Firms are able to sell their information on analyst performance to
institutional investors, but only to the extent that the firms do not make
the information available at little or no cost to the public. As a result, firms
such as StarMine have discontinued their services for retail investors in
favor of their institutional clientele.291
3.

Political Viability

A third concern is that the registration and disclosure requirements
of SECAW are not politically viable and that, in particular, the research
industry will object to the requirements. Although the disclosure requirements are not cost free, there are reasons to believe that they are actually
consistent with analysts’ business interests as well as those of the markets.
First, substituting disclosure requirements for substantive regulation
restores flexibility for research firms in funding and subsidizing analyst
research. Firms that are able to exploit synergies between their business
operations, such as between research and investment banking, will be able
to benefit from those synergies as long as they disclose the relationships.
The market, in turn, will be in a better position to evaluate the effect of
the relationship.
Second, SECAW will increase the distribution and visibility of analyst
research. Widespread distribution of analyst research (at least after preferred and institutional clients have been given access) serves the needs
of issuers and institutional investors by increasing sales, generating
demand, and driving up stock prices. Indeed, one of the problems with
the issuer-financed model is the risk that no one will read the resulting
reports. Ironically, by enabling low-cost distribution and comparison of
analyst information, SECAW may serve as a mechanism for allowing
the market to test the issuer-financed model.
Third, SECAW may offer a justification for reevaluating the appropriate nature and scope of analyst liability exposure for securities fraud.
Under current law, the liability exposure of research analysts remains
unpredictable. Although courts have dismissed a number of lawsuits against
analysts and their firms arising out of the collapse of the technology bubble,

291.
See supra note 286 (describing StarMine’s decision to stop providing free analyst
ratings to retail investors).
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other cases remain.292 Class actions premised on the fraud on the market
theory—in which class members do not need to establish reliance on
analyst misstatements—offer the potential for particularly large exposure.
Although exploring the various arguments regarding litigation reform is
beyond the scope of this Article, SECAW offers a vehicle for exploring
alternative mechanisms to traditional class action litigation for increasing analyst accountability. One possibility, for example, that would
increase analyst incentives for candor on SECAW would be to establish
a safe harbor from fraud liability for information that is properly
disclosed. Another possibility would be to exploit the reduced enforcement
costs associated with SECAW’s transparency by replacing private
litigation against analysts with SEC enforcement.293 These alternatives
to traditional litigation would likely be welcomed by the research
community, would be consistent with the goal of enhancing information
flow in the securities markets, and would eliminate the difficult questions
about loss causation and damages that have plagued private civil litigation against analysts.

CONCLUSION
In a time when public confidence in the markets is low, it is tempting
for regulators to seek to offer investors greater protection against losses.
The analyst scandals enabled regulators and the investing public to
scapegoat research analysts for failing to operate as reliable gatekeepers and
led to reforms that attempted to establish a gatekeeping role by mandating
analyst independence.
It is unclear whether the reforms have had the effect of making sellside research more reliable. In particular, the existing reforms contain
substantial gaps in coverage, leaving analysts with continued incentives to
issue overly optimistic recommendations. Several effects of the reforms
are undisputed, however—they have reduced the quantity of research
292.
One recent example is a pending class action against Credit Suisse and its analysts
in connection with research about America Online (AOL). The district court recently
rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged both transaction and loss causation. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., No. 0212146-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86363 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2006).
293.
The extent to which public enforcement or criminal litigation serves as a substitute
for private civil liability is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of the interplay
and potentially complementary roles of government enforcement actions and private civil
litigation, see Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, L AW &
C ONTEMP. P ROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 198–202.
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available to the market in general and retail investors in particular, they
have reduced coverage for smaller issuers, and they have increased the
segmentation between institutional and retail investors.
This Article demonstrates that these effects were predictable; by
reducing firms’ ability to subsidize research through other business
activities, the reforms have eliminated a key source of funding, particularly
the funding of coverage for new and smaller issuers. By reducing firms’
ability to exploit synergies between research and other business activities,
the reforms may also be reducing information quality.
This Article advocates an alternative to mandated independence—
managing analyst conflicts of interest. The Article has proposed that the
SEC require registration by analysts who disseminate information to
the investing public coupled with public disclosure of analyst recommendations, conflicts, and other information relevant to an assessment of the
reliability of the analyst’s research. By substituting analyst registration
and SECAW for the mandatory independence required by existing law, the
SEC would provide firms with the flexibility to finance quality research.
At the same time, SECAW would enhance the transparency of that
research, enabling investors and the market—rather than regulators—to
evaluate research quality.

